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A significant and challenging topic for contemporary geography is an 
understanding of how the social construction of space both reflects social forces and 
at the same time structures those forces. This thesis is a case st1.1dy of how political 
and social attitudes, measured as an outcome of votes for different issues, reflect the 
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social organization of space in Multnomah County, Oregon. It employs an areal-
structural (ecological) approach. Using eleven different issues voted upon in the 
general elections of November, 1990, it analyzes relationships between ballot items 
and socioeconomic characteristics of the electorate for small geographic areas in the 
county. The 1990 election was selected to permit a minimum possible temporal gap 
in the comparative analysis data with returns from the 1990 census of population. 
Using a technique from the field of Geographic Information Systems (GIS), 
"block group" census divisions were "overlayed" with voting precinct boundaries. This 
permitted identification of clusters or proportions of block groups falling within each 
precinct. Factor analysis, correlation analysis, and cluster analysis were used to 
identify relationships among the measures themselves, to establish associations 
between the measures and socioeconomic data from the census, and to characterize 
spatial patterns of voting. 
The following conclusions emerge: 
(1) Factor analysis confirms that voting patterns for the eleven issues can be 
aggregated into two basic trends: ''westside vs. eastside" and "inner city vs. periphery". 
(2) Cluster analysis shows that neighboring precincts have common voting 
patterns that create distinctive geographic regions. A new GIS method was 
developed to permit quantification of the geographic component of cluster analysis. 
(3) Correlation analysis of census and electoral data at the precinct level 
indicates high correlations of voting patterns with two socioeconomic dimensions: 
status (education, income, occupation) and position in the life cycle (age, marital 
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status, family size). Such analysis was permitted by new GIS capabilities that allow 
the use of less aggregated block group data. 
( 4) Cluster analysis of residuals shows a significant geographic patterning that 
suggests the existence of a "neighborhood effect" in Multnomah County, although 
confirmation requires further analysis. 
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CHAPTER I 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
INTRODUCfiON 
The locality can be examined as a realm in which political and social 
life has its own trajectory .... All events, however large in a global sense, 
are ultimately transformed into a local issue ... .ln turn, the locality 
determines the options for individuals to create collectives, to exert 
political pressure, and to recreate themselves, both individually and as 
groups (Kirby, 1989, p. 216). 
Understanding how the social construction of space both reflects societal 
forces and at the same time structures those forces is important and challenging to 
contemporary geography. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the construction 
of political attitudes. Voting behavior historically has been known for its strong 
spatial patterning, which usually correlates with dominant social and economic 
variables. However the geography of voting is not the simple expression of social and 
economic characteristics. Geographic relations in cities can well reflect significant 
underlying social differences within society, even as they shape and reproduce those 
relationships (Hodge and Staeheli, 1992). 
Studies at the urban scale have been a major growth area in political 
geography, rivaling electoral geography as the spearhead of the sub-discipline's 
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resurgence. 
In my thesis, I attempt to show the extent to which political and social 
attitudes, measured as an outcome of votes for different issues, reflect the spatial 
organization of Multnomah County social space. More specifically, the purpose has 
been to understand the relationships between ballot items and socioeconomic 
characteristics of the electorate. It also shows the spatial distribution and the 
distribution within the social space of voting patterns in Multnomah County for the 
eleven different issues voted upon in the general elections in November, 1990, using 
an areal-structural approach. 
The focus of this thesis is predominantly empirical. This does not mean that 
the thesis is devoid of theory. Chapter I is devoted to a theoretical discussion. 
Subsequently, the body of the study is directed towards illustrating and exemplifying 
some of the methods used in electoral geography. It is a case-study dealing with 
contextual and spatial influences on voting behavior based particularly upon 
aggregate/quantitative research methods (Chapter II). 
The areal basis for the case-study is Multnomah County and the city of 
Portland, Oregon. The data are the results of votes in eleven issues during the 
general elections of November, 1990. Recent developments in Geographical 
Information Systems (GIS) make it possible to use more geographically detailed 
analysis of voting behavior by precincts and to compare the outcome of the votes with 
data of the 1990 Census by census block groups. Previous researchers were forced 
to use less detailed analysis- usually full census tracts with more aggregated data. 
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The study links census data to the results of the votes for the eleven issues 
that were on the ballot in November, 1990. 
The analysis itself can be divided into the following parts: 
1) interrelationships between the outcome of votes for the eleven measures; 
2) geographical distribution of these votes in Multnomah County; 
3) factor analysis of votes, which helps to identify recurring commonalities in 
geographical voting patterns; 
4) cluster analysis of votes, which helps to define geographical areas in 
Multnomah County with the recurring voting patterns; 
5) an experimental method for quantification of the geographical clustering; 
6) census data recalculated by precincts, using GIS capabilities; 
7) links between census and voting data established through correlation 
analysis which find socioeconomic and life-style variables with the correlation 
coefficients; 
8) calculations and further cluster analysis of residuals between voting 
outcomes and socioeconomic data in an attempt to estimate or at least to find 
evidence of the "neighborhood effect"; and, fmally, 
9) comparison of existing neighborhood boundaries with clusters of votes, as 
well as with clusters of residuals between votes and census data, in an attempt to 
determine possible relationships between existing neighborhoods and voting behavior 
of the population of Portland. 
However, the results of the last test appeared to be inconclusive showing the 
weak side of the suggested model. 
ELECfORAL GEOGRAPHY AS A SPECIFIC PART OF POLITICAL 
GEOGRAPHY 
4 
Political geography has been defined as "the science of political areas" 
(Hartshorne, 1935, p. 804), "the study of geographical area and political process" 
(Ackerman, et al., 1965, p. 32), "the spatial analysis of political phenomena" 
(Kasperson and Minghi, 1969, p. xi), a set of "locational approaches to power and 
conflict" (Cox, Reynolds and Rokkan, 1974), and simply "political studies from spatial 
perspectives" (Burnett and Taylor, 1981 ). 
Since the classic study by Krebheil (1916), the spatial analysis of voting has 
been the dominant focus of behavioral research in political geography. During the 
post-war period, when general interest in political geography tended to stagnate or 
decline, the study of electoral geography has expanded greatly (Muir, 1974). 
Long recognized as a subfield of political geography, electoral geography has, 
in the views of some geographers, little in common either theoretically or 
methodologically with the rest of the field (Reynolds, Knight, 1989). To some 
researchers, electoral geography is an integral part of the discipline; to others it 
seems to be a discipline in its own right; and still others would assert that electoral 
geography is the very core and substance of political geography (Cox, 1968a). It has 
also been suggested that electoral geography belongs more to the realm of sociology 
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than political geography (Crone, 1967). 
Electoral geography, or the systematic spatial analysis of elections, has a long 
intellectual history. The mapping of voting statistics has provided important insights 
into the operation of modern politics (Shelley, Johnston, Taylor, 1990). The study 
of electoral results has long been prominent in political geography, where attention 
has been focused on such issues as geographic reasons that prompt a government to 
select a given electoral method or electoral boundaries, geographic factors that 
contribute to electoral patterns, and reasons why governments seek to change 
electoral procedures (Prescott, 1969). This kind of research, which is descriptive and 
largely ideographic, has dominated the geographer's concern with elections until 
recently. 
Quantitative electoral geography was a major growth area in political 
geography in the 1970s. It can justifiably claim to have made an important 
contribution to the modern resurgence of the subdiscipline. Certainly, one of the 
important reasons underlying the growth of interest in electoral geography concerns 
the ready availability of statistical electoral data. Election statistics provide material 
for a variety of analyses, and among studies particularly significant to political 
geography are those which focus on direct spatial causes and implications of electoral 
behavior. By the early 1980s, considerable progress had been made concerning 
relationships between the spatial distribution of voters and the spatial organization 
of the electorate (Morrill, 1981; O'Loughlin, 1982; and O'Loughlin and Taylor, 1982). 
Unlike other growth areas of the recent past, electoral geography has gone from 
6 
strength to strength as new techniques and methodologies have been applied to old 
problems (Taylor, 1985). 
Recently, there has developed interest in analysis of voting patterns 
themselves, rather than the systems through which votes are cast. This interest in 
voting behavior has taken two forms: the areal-structural (or ecological) approach 
and the behavioral (or process-oriented) approach (McPhail, 1974). 
The areal-structural approach in electoral geography 
In the more traditional areal-structural approach, electoral geographers 
explained voting patterns according to a simple plan (Prescott, 1972). They made the 
basic assumption that people voted according to what they perceive to be their best 
interests, and these perceptions and choices were related to the sociological, 
economic, or ethnic characteristics of electorates. Geographers then explored 
characteristics of voters that might give clues to the nature of their self-interest. 
Areal variations in social and economic class, religion, nationality, and race were 
among prime factors considered. Using these methods, political geographers 
explained the foundations of voting patterns for whole countries or large regions, and 
sometimes for even smaller spatial units, such as electoral and census divisions. In 
addition they claimed to be able to predict how patterns would change as the 
franchise altered or as migration occurred. However, such an approach reveals 
nothing about factors that motivate an individual vote, although it is usually possible, 
with care, to draw some general inferences (Walmsley and Lewis, 1984). 
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The behavioral approach in electoral geography 
The behavioral approach was suggested by a new school of electoral 
geographers represented by Cox (1968b, 1969), and Archer and Reynolds (1969). 
They consider the ecological approach to have two main defects. First, the 
correlation of aggregate data such as votes and economic status does not allow any 
difference or prediction to be made about individual behavior. Second, they called 
this method to be not distinctively geographical. Such perceived defects led these 
geographers, and others, to recommend an approach that focuses on spatial 
processes, such as contagion, or contextual influences. The behavioral approach 
looks at how individuals come to acquire and evaluate political information. 
Particular attention is paid to the tendency for political information to circulate within 
formal and informal social groups. These studies frequently use survey data and 
emphasize the process underlying a voting decision to the point where electoral 
outcome of those decisions is virtually ignored (Walmsley and Lewis, 1984). Usually, 
survey methods are preferable when examining the contextual effect. However, a few 
objections to their use persist. First, because of the prohibitive cost and time 
involved in such surveys, voters sampled are necessarily from a local population. 
Second, there is undoubtedly some contextual influence present in survey data 
(O'Loughlin, 1981; Taylor and Johnston, 1979). Prescott (1972) has argued that 
geographers have not wished to make conclusions about individual behavior. They 
have been much more concerned with aggregate behavior in discrete regions. 
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The analysis of areal-structural voting data is, and will continue to be, 
a highly useful dimension of electoral research. Electoral studies distinguish the 
general distribution of support within a study area. Such studies are rich in historical 
perspective. Since this approach focuses upon constituencies, results have immediate 
relevance to the distribution of other types of political phenomena and to the 
functioning of the political system (Kasperson, 1969). 
The traditional hypothesis regarding voting behavior is that individuals cast ~· 
their ballots in order to maximize their self-interest. On many local referenda this 
ought to be evident from a cost-benefit analysis, calculating the economic return 
voters will get if they vote for a certain proposal that, if carried, will mean greater 
expenditure by them in property taxes (Taylor and Johnston, 1979). In analyses of 
a large number of referenda, Wilson and Banfield (1964) found that only part of this 
self-interest hypothesis was valid: renters were indeed more generally in favor of 
spending referenda than were homeowners, but a greater percentage of high-income 
homeowners were likely to vote 'yes' than were their middle-income counterparts. 
This unexpected pattern, Wilson and Banfield pointed out, could be the result of the 
low marginal utility of dollars to high-income people, but the latter did not vote for 
spending on all issues. Their analysis showed that it was the upper-income groups 
who were most likely to vote for certain spending programs because these were in 
the public interest, even if relatively expensive to them personally. 
One of the important theories in voting behavior is so-called "public choice" 
theory, which has been developed by political scientists. Public choice theory 
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concerns such matters as voting behavior, representation, party politics, and 
bureaucratic decision-making. The basic behavioral postulate employed is that 
political man is an 'egoistic, rational, utility maximizer' (Mueller, 1979). An essential 
aspect of the appeal of the public choice framework is that it offers an ingredient 
essential to the systematic investigation of the relationship between political processes 
and the geographical landscape. Empirical patterns derived from application of 
public choice theory merit attention. They are relevant in two ways. First, there is 
the possibility of empirically testing propositions involving the "rational man" 
hypothesis of the public choice paradigm within a geographical context. Second, 
there is the possibility of using public choice constructs to illuminate existing 
observations regarding political-geographical patterns (Archer, 1981). Urban scale 
research intended to test public choice precepts in a geographical context was done 
by Archer and Reynolds (1976). They examined a bond referendum to test the 
rational voter hypothesis and found considerable empirical support. From a 
geographical point of view, their findings indicated that voter self-interest can be a 
statistically viable hypothesis in interpreting geographical patterns of electoral 
behavior. From a public choice standpoint, consideration of the setting, which 
involved explicit publicity about the geographical pattern of expected benefit 
incidence, eliminated ambiguities often present in empirical test of the rational voter 
model. 
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THE CONCEPT OF NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECf 
Political socialization theory has been one of the major growth areas in 
political science. It has come to be seen as a key process promoting stability of a 
political system. However, attempts to develop a universal theory of political 
socialization have been unsuccessful (Renshon, 1977). Political socialization does not 
consist of universal processes but involves particular processes operating in concrete 
social situations. It is the experiences of individuals within their specific localities 
which provide the context and raw material for socialization. For some geographers 
this aspect of electoral geography represents their unique contribution to voting 
studies, since it involves particular spatial influences on voting distinct from 
socioeconomic explanations offered by political scientists and political sociologists 
(Taylor, 1985, 1989). 
Working in the context of the studies of electoral cleavages, students of spatial 
variations in support for various political parties (as far as these studies were done 
mostly for party-based elections), using spatially aggregated (often called ecological) 
data, expect to identify correlations between aspects of the socioeconomic 
characteristics of an area's population and the level of support for particular parties. 
Such correlations have almost invariably been found (Johnston, Forrest, 1985). This 
suggests that the geography of voting is basically a function of the economic and 
social geography of a territory. However, these studies show something more: that _ 
estimating the number of votes for a party in an area requires more than merely 
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summing the number of votes in each socioeconomic category multiplied by the 
probabilities associated with the likelihood of their voting for that party. In general, 
the degree of support for a party is usually greater than predicted where its electoral 
base is strong, and less than predicted where that base is weak (Miller, 1977). 
The implication of this finding, which can be verified by a study of regression 
coefficients associated with the correlations, is that there are spatial variations in the 
propensity of members of a particular group to support a certain party. 
Such spatial variations in the propensity to support a particular party are 
examples of a general phenomenon widely observed in many areas of social behavior, 
known as the "structural effect". According to this concept, people are influenced in 
their behavior not only by their 'objective situation' within society but also by the 
social milieu in which they interact. The greater the difference between the norms 
of a person's social group and those of his or her local milieu, the greater the 
likelihood that the person will abandon the former and adopt the latter, according 
to the theory underlying the concept of structural effect (Johnston, Forrest, 1985). 
The main source of the hypothesized neighborhood effect in the spatial science 
literature was a review by Cox (1969) on ''The Voting Decision in a Spatial Context". 
He identified the spatial clustering of voters for particular parties or candidates and 
suggested, following Hagerstrand's (1967) classic work on diffusion, that such spatial 
regularities convey a strong suggestion of spatial contagion. From this he assumed 
the existence of such contagion and presented his work as providing a valid account 
of it. He portrayed individual voting behavior as influenced by the information and 
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cues dominant in the voter's area of residence, and he suggested that this could be 
accounted for by relating the voting decision of individuals at their location in an 
information-flow network (Johnston, 1986). 
The neighborhood effect is the most studied geographical influence in voting, 
especially party voting. The neighborhood effect postulates the following process: for 
any individual in an election campaign there are two sources of information: the 
general information from the mass media available to everybody and the particular 
information derived from local contacts. The latter will be biased to the extent that 
the individual lives in a partisan area. Hence, general information will go through a 
partisan filter in the voting decision-making process. The result will be that all classes 
living in working-class areas will be more likely to vote for the 'natural' party of the 
area and all classes living in middle-class areas will be more likely to vote for the 
'natural party' of that area (Taylor, 1989). 
However, debates concerning the neighborhood effect go on unabated. In one 
exchange, Johnston (1987) and McAllister (1987) produced contrary findings for 
recent British elections: Johnston provided evidence for locational influences on party 
voting levels; McAllister, using a different type of analysis, showed that location 
variables are not required to explain party voting variations. This debate can be 
portrayed as an inter-disciplinary dispute, with geographers developing models where 
location is important (for example, Johnston) and political scientists preferring to 
concentrate on political variables that are nation-wide in their effects (McAllister,). 
The problem with the neighborhood effect has always been that it is difficult 
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to measure. One approach was to treat the neighborhood effect as a residual after 
socioeconomic variables had been accounted for. This approach was adopted by 
O'Loughlin (1981) in a comprehensive and rigorous statistical evaluation of the 
neighborhood effect. A wide range of socioeconomic variables were regressed against 
voting returns in each city, and residuals from the analysis were mapped. An 
autocorrelation analysis of these residuals showed very significant 'clustering' in all 
cases. This indicates that the variation in voting not explained by the socioeconomic 
variables is not spatially random. From this it is inferred that some form of 
neighborhood effect is operating in addition to the socioeconomic determinants of 
voting. 
Johnston (1979) has devised another method of inferring neighborhood effects. 
If a national voter transition matrix is applied separately to each individual 
constituency's initial election results, an estimate of a new voting pattern is produced 
which assumes every constituency changes in exactly the same way as the country as 
a whole. This predicted voting pattern can be compared to the actual voting pattern 
in a second election. Differences between the actual and predicted are direct 
measures of how each constituency differs from the national trend. As such, these 
differences can be used to evaluate the neighborhood effect. 
VOTING ON PROPOSITIONS (REFERENDA) 
Among the most interesting of all elections to geographers are those involving 
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initiatives and referenda. American state constitutions and city charters often 
contain provisions by which legislators or the general public can place specific issues 
on election ballots for voter approval. During the Progressive Era of the twentieth 
century many states and municipalities enacted statutory or constitutional provisions 
permitting the use of initiatives, referenda, and recall of elected officials. An 
initiative is an issue placed on the ballot by petition from the general public. A 
referendum is one placed on the election ballot by an elected legislative body 
(Archer, Shelley, 1986). 
However, research on voting in referenda has had a rather episodic history, 
with two identifiable cycles of intense interest (Sharp, 1988). One was a burst of 
analytical activity in the early 1960s out of which the 'alienated voter' model of local 
referendum voting emerged (Horton and Thompson, 1962; Pinard, 1963; McDill, 
Ridley, 1962; Stone, 1965). This model, together with Banfield and Wilson's (1963) 
'ethos' theory analysis of social-class differences in local voting, dominated discussions 
of local referendum voting in the 1960s. In the 1970s attention was given to school-
finance referenda (Alexander and Bass, 1974; Giles et al.,1976; Hall and Piele, 1976) 
- an interest prompted by the 'crisis' of increased taxpayer rejection of school-
financing issues nationwide (Boss, 1976). 
voting: 
Cataldo and Holm (1983) identify the following five explanations of local 
(1) a 'rational self-interest' explanation positing that individuals vote 
consistent with their assessment of economic gains and losses accruing to them 
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from a proposal; 
(2) a 'socioeconomic status' explanation - essentially that portion of the 
Banfield and Wilson (1963) ethos theory that stipulates a greater propensity 
for upper-status individuals (or areas) to support local expenditure proposals; 
(3) a 'political attitudes' explanation, positing that general attitudes 
toward government, as well as more specific attitudes about political issues 
and institutions, can account for patterns of voting; 
( 4) a 'taxpayer revolt' explanation that links local voting decisions to 
broader perceptions that taxes are too high and that government should be 
reined; and 
( 5) a 'community conflict' explanation positing that major social 
cleavages in the community, such as those along racial or religious lines, 
condition many local issues, leading to bloc voting when referendum issues 
polarize the community along these enduring fault lines. 
Among these explanations, the first ('rational self-interest') might be the most 
important since it includes a broader scope than all the others. It is based on the 
assumption that people will vote to support that party which most closely meets the 
voter's own interests. Because of its more specific nature, issue voting (in which the 
contest has become closely associated with a particular problem) shows more clearly 
how the voter uses the vote to meet his own needs or preferences. Political 
economists suggest that voting is a means by which the individual is able to increase 
his expected utility. Also, if self-interest is a prime motivational force underlying 
•• 
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voting behavior, the value of issue voting is that governments will gain a reasonably 
accurate assessment of attitudes to specific problems. For geographers, the important 
part is that the attitudes voters have towards particular issues will vary spatially where 
the issue imposes 'costs' and/or 'benefits' that themselves vary spatially. These spatial 
differences in voting reflect the use of the vote to protect self-interests or the 
interests of the voter's community (Muir and Paddison, 1981 ). 
More recently, analysis of intra-metropolitan variations in voting patterns on 
major public issues was done by Sharp (1987), Guest et al (1988), Greenberg and 
Amer (1989), and Hodge and Staeheli (1992). Sharp's (1987) research analyzes the 
response by voters in Kansas City to two tax-and-spend type propositions and to a 
fluoridation proposal. The author used predictor variables representing 
socioeconomic status explanation, the model of alienated voting, the 'taxpayer-revolt' 
explanation, and community cleavage explanations. The results highlight the 
explanatory importance of racial cleavages, and provide a contingency perspective on 
the significance of the socioeconomic status explanation. 
In the research by Guest et al (1988), the authors in a case study of the Seattle 
metropolitan region argued that residential segregation by type of industrial affiliation 
is an important determinant of community culture. The unit of analysis was census 
tract. Communities with high employment in service activities are especially 
characterized by support of the so called 'Pluralistic Culture', involving high tolerance 
of minorities and support for open and responsive government. These communities 
are also less supportive of the 'Rights of Business' than other parts of the metropolis. 
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Industrial affiliation is more important than class, ethnic, or mobility factors in 
explaining variations in 'Pluralistic Culture'; it is less important than other predictors 
in interpreting support for 'Rights of Business'. 
Greenberg and Amer (1989) studied voter support for the $100 million New 
Jersey hazardous waste bond issue in 1981. The minor civil division (town, city, 
borough) was the unit of analysis. Analysis showed that support increased with the 
presence of minority populations, socioeconomic status, urbanization, young families, 
and a history of support for the Democratic party - variables that previously have 
been identified as associated with support for environmental programs (Sears, 1980; 
Elazar, 1984). In addition, communities closer to hazardous waste sites strongly 
supported the bond issue. Nearly all of these communities also stood to benefit from 
a companion water supply bond issue. Opposition to the bond issue was centered in 
southwest and northwest New Jersey - that is, in rural, relatively poor, and white 
communities far from hazardous waste sites which were fearful of losing abundant 
local water supplies because of the water bond issue. Thus, while the strong general 
statewide support suggests the vote was a symbol for a cleaner environment, intra-
state variations suggest that most voters considered their personal benefits and costs 
before casting ballots. 
A recent study by Hodge and Staebell (1992) was done for the Seattle 
metropolitan area. It sought to describe and explain geographic patterns of support 
for basic dimensions of urban electoral behavior. Sixty-two ballots were reduced to 
two major electoral dimensions, one partisan, and one issue-oriented, which had very 
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strong geographic identity. Findings indicated that partisan responses are governed 
by position in both the sphere of production and sphere of consumption. Issue 
politics, on the other hand, were affected most strongly by position in the sphere of 
production, even though they often included what appeared to be consumption-
oriented ballots. Location within the metropolitan region is implied in the ways 
consumption and production relations were joined within individuals and in the 
political cultures of the central city and suburbs. 
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
The State of Oregon has a long populist tradition of voting directly on 
numerous non-partisan political issues, rather than relying on the "wisdom" of political 
elites. State and local laws facilitate submission of issues to "the people". Oregon is 
one of 22 states that permit the initiative process, and employment of the initiative 
process has been substantial. 
Multnomah County is important in Oregon, since more than 20 percent of the 
state's population lives within it. Besides that it is Oregon's longest, most diverse 
county with well defined neighborhoods. Based on considerations expressed in the 
first part of the thesis, the decision was made to use the areal-structural method for 
the analysis of voting behavior. Because of the selected method, elections close to 
a census year were selected to minimize the temporal gap between dates when data 
was collected. Voting precincts were chosen for areal divisions. The decision was 
made to focus on precinct voting on eleven different issues submitted in the 
November 1990 general election. The turnout for that election was high- reaching 
77 percent. Other elections are not included, primarily because they are not very 
close to the census year, turnouts were generally small relative to the general election, 
and some precinct boundaries changed. 
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In Multnomah County, voting is conducted in more than 460 electoral 
precincts. Data from 440 electoral precincts were used for the statistical analysis. 
For other omitted precincts, the number of votes cast was less than 100 people. 
The election selected permits linkage to 1990 census data. Using 
ARC/INF081 "intersect", procedure the county's block groups were "overlayed" with 
the voting precinct boundaries that were obtained in 1990. This permitted 
identification of the cluster of block groups, or proportions of block groups, that fall 
within each precinct. A necessary assumption for boundaries that do not match is 
that the population is evenly distributed within census blocks. In brief, the GIS 
technique used for the allocation can be described by the following: 
1. All of the 1990 precincts in Multnomah County were identified. The 
precinct boundaries were on a computer map produced by the Portland 
Metropolitan Service District (Metro), Portland's regional planning 
organization. 
2. Using the computer, I overlaid a map of census block centroids for 
Multnomah County precincts and totaled the block population for each 
precinct. 
3. Using the computer I overlaid the intersected map, defined in "2" 
above with a map of census block groups. I assumed that within each block 
group the incidence of population was even. 
1 Environmental Systems Research Institute, Inc., PC ARC/INFo•, Ver. 
3.40 Plus, Redlands, CA, 1993. 
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4. Knowing the population for each census block, block group, and 
precinct, the allocation proportion was calculated to assign block group 
information from the 1990 census to the precincts. 
Correlations and cluster analysis were done using SYSTA~. For 
correlations, the Pearson correlation matrix was used. For cluster analysis K.MEANS 
class of clustering was used. K-means clustering splits a set of objects into a selected 
number of groups by maximizing between-cluster variations relative to within-cluster 
variation (Hartigan, 1975). The data were standardized before analysis. Mapping 
was done using Atlas Pro e3. 
The choice of independent variables to explain socioeconomic status was 
difficult. Various measures of socioeconomic status are strongly correlated with each 
other. In Multnomah County the most likely community cleavage is a result of race-
ethnicity or religion. However, religion was excluded from the analysis because the 
quality of information available on religion was not comparable with the quality of 
census and election data. 
2 SYSTAT, Inc., SYSTA~, Ver. 3, Evanston, IL, 1989. 
3 Strategic Mapping Inc., Atlas Pro: Geographic Data Analysis and 
Presentation•, Ver. 2.0, Santa Clara, CA, 1992. 
CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS 
VOTING FOR MEASURES IN MULTNOMAH COUNTY 
Eleven ballot measures chosen for study appeared on the election ballot in 
November 1990. These issues have diverse origins and purposes. Some represent 
tax measures, while others are the consequences of legislative action or popular 
initiative. Topics of such ballot measures relate to the rights of specific groups in the 
society, the role of government in regulating social and institutional life, the nature 
of taxation, and the means by which the government could be held accountable to its 
citizens (Guest et al., 1988). While it is not possible to explain fully each issue in the 
thesis, I have provided the official ballot title and brief synopsis of each in Appendix 
A The summary of each issue is provided in TABLE I. The percentage of 'yes" or 
"no" votes on any issue is based on all persons voting on that specific issue. 
All eleven measures can be combined into several groups: Measures 1 and 2 
may be characterized in terms of management efficiency; Measures 3, 5, 7 , and 11 -
in terms of tax reform; Measures 4 and 6 are environmentally oriented issues; 
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TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF STATE MEASURES ON NOVEMBER 1990 ELECfiONS 
SUMMARY Percentage of 
''yes"f'no" votes 
Measure 1 Grants Metropolitan Service District electors Passed 55/45 
the right to self-governance. 
Measure 2 Constitutional amendment allows merged Passed 70/30 
school districts to combine tax bases. 
Measure 3 Repeals tax exemption, grants additional Failed: 44/56 
benefit payments for PERS retirees. 
Measure 4 Prohibits Trojan operation until nuclear Failed: 
waste, cost, earthquake standards are met. 49.9/50.1 
Measure 5 State constitutional limit on property taxes Passed: 55/45 
for schools, government operations. 
Measure 6 Product packaging must meet recycling Passed: 53/4 7 
standards or receive hardship waiver. 
Measure 7 Six-county work in lieu of welfare benefits Passed: 57/43 
pilot program. 
Measure 8 Amends Oregon Constitution to prohibit Failed: 27/73 
abortion with three exceptions. 
Measure 9 Requires the use of safety belts. Passed: 61/39 
Measure 10 Doctor must give parent notice before Failed: 41/59 
minor's abortion. 
Measure 11 School choice system, tax credit for education Failed: 32/68 
outside public schools. 
Measures 8 and 10 are anti-abortion measures. They, along with Measure 9 to some 
extent, may be seen in terms of personal rights or personal freedoms. 
It would be logical to assume high correlation coefficients between passed and 
defeated measures. Overall in Multnomah County, Measures 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 9 
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passed, and Measures 3, 4, 8, 10, and 11 were defeated. Among defeated measures 
were two tax exemption and tax credit measures (Measures 3 and 11) which might 
be characterized in terms of a 'taxpayer revolt', along with Measures 5 and 7, which 
passed. Also among defeated measures were- Measure 8 and 11, two conservative, 
anti-abortion proposals. Measure 4 would prohibit nuclear plant operations until 
ecological, safety, and cost standards are met. Also the anti-business and 'green' 
Measure 6 (packaging must meet recycling standards) passed. However correlation 
analysis of votes for the different measures produced unanticipated results (TABLE 
II). 
The correlation coefficients are high and it is possible to make an assumption, 
that people voted for or against groups of measures throughout the county (or maybe 
it was a common predisposition to vote in certain patterns, without the voter seeing 
the pattern). In other words, if a person voted for Measure 1, he would have very 
likely voted for Measures 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9 as well, and against Measures 5, 7, 8, 10, 
and 11, and vice versa. The coefficients are high within selected categories of 
measures: management efficiency, tax reform, environmental issues, and personal 
rights. Discrepancy between passed and defeated measures on one hand and 
measures with the high correlation on the other, shows to some extent the different 
origin and possible outcome of these proposals. However, the two measures calling 
for management efficiency passed; measures categorized as tax reform' failed or 
passed in a way that shows the effect of the 'taxpayer's revolt' described earlier. A 
split occurred on environmental issues, although the correlation coefficient between 
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these two measures is very high ( .90). 
TABLE II 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN VOTES FOR MEASURES 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 
M1 1 .87 .81 .60 -.50 .76 -.45 -.80 .70 -.86 -.60 
M2 .87 1 .76 .66 -.33 .66 -.31 -.75 .83 -.83 -.55 
M3 .81 .76 1 .48 -.41 .64 -.36 -.72 .68 -.76 -.55 
M4 .60 .66 .48 1 -.74 .90 -.78 .58 .19 -.63 -.34 
M5 -.50 -.33 -.41 -.74 1 -.75 .79 .46 -.12 .48 .32 
M6 .76 .66 .64 .90 -.75 1 -.74 -.72 .42 -.78 -.48 
M7 -.45 -.31 -.36 -.78 .79 -.74 1 .52 -.04 .54 .31 
M8 -.80 -.75 -.72 -.58 .46 -.72 .52 1 -.61 .96 .69 
M9 .70 .83 .68 .19 -.12 .42 -.04 -.61 1 -.66 -.61 
M10 -.86 -.83 -.76 -.63 .48 -.78 .54 .96 -.66 1 .67 
M11 -.60 -.55 -.55 -.34 .32 -.48 .31 .69 -.61 .67 1 
Measure 4, which would prohibit Trojan nuclear plant operations until standards were 
met, failed in Multnomah County by about 0.1 %. Another split was in the 'personal 
rights' group: although the two anti-abortion measures were overwhelmingly rejected 
by voters, the automobile 'safety belt' measure passed. However, the 'safety belt' 
measure also might be seen not as a personal freedom measute, but as a measure 
more associated with additional spending (higher insurance, more police on the roads, 
etc.). Either way, its connection with the anti-abortion measures is not definite. 
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To appreciate the spatial distribution of votes, it is necessary to say a few 
words about regional divisions in Multnomah County. Portland, historically, for 
purposes of address identification, has been divided into five large and distinctive 
regions: Southwest, Northwest, Southeast, Northeast, and North. These divisions are 
well known to Portlanders by street prefix directions (for example: SW Park Avenue 
or NE Halsey Street). The Willamette River is the division line between the 
Westside and the Eastside, and east/west running Burnside Street (approximately in 
the central part of Portland) was adopted to separate North and South. However, 
street addresses are not the only difference between these areas. People adopted this 
regional division for the identification of were they live. There appear to be 
stereotypes associated with each part of the city. Portlanders usually think about the 
Westside as an area of upper-middle class neighborhoods, the Downtown with a 
relatively large student community (Portland State University is located in 
Downtown). The Eastside is thought to be less homogeneous: small clusters of 
upper-middle class neighborhoods in the southern parts of the Southeast and the 
central parts of the Northeast are surrounded by medium- and low-middle class 
neighborhoods. Some areas in the Northeast and the North traditionally have been 
seen as a low-income and low-middle class areas and are considered to be sort of 
''welfare ghettos". These five areas very often are used, especially by the media, as 
the reference point for different analyses or comparisons. 
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SPACIAL DISTRffiUTION OF VOTES IN MULTNOMAH COUNTY 
The geographical distribution of votes is shown on FIGURES 1 - 11. The 
general patterns of votes are ''west" vs. "east", and very close to that of "south" vs. 
"north", and "inner city" vs. "periphery". Indeed, in votes for Measure 1 (FIGURE 
1 ), most of the precincts in which people were in favor of the measure are 
concentrated west of the Willamette River and in the central and western parts of 
East Portland, while precincts in which people were more likely to oppose the 
measure are in the eastern part of Multnomah County and in the North Portland. 
The same in also true for votes for Measure 2 (FIGURE 2), Measure 3 (FIGURE 
3), Measure 4 (FIGURE 4), Measure 6 (FIGURE 6) and Measure 9 (FIGURE 9). 
Votes for Measure 5 (FIGURE 5) assume a different pattern: most precincts where 
people favored the measure are on the edges of the county, often outside the city 
limits, while people in Portland voted against the measure. In votes for Measures 7 
(FIGURE 7), 8 (FIGURE 8), 10 (FIGURE 10), and 11 (FIGURE 11), most of the 
precincts where people voted for these measures are located in the eastern and 
northern parts of the county, versus western and southern parts where people were 
less likely to vote for these measures. 
The analysis based on viewing all eleven measures on a one-by-one basis is 
rather complicated. For the purpose of simplifying it, a principal component analysis 
was performed using SYSTAT. In such an analysis, principal components are 
weighted linear composites of observed variables. Common factors are unobserved 
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variables that are hypothesized to account for the intercorrelations among observed 
variables. The principal component analysis showed two distinct dimensions, which 
are practically the same as those descnbed earlier. Factor loadings for these 
dimensions are presented in TABLE III. 
TABLE III 
FACfOR LOADINGS FOR ELECfORAL DIMENSIONS 
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACfOR 3 
Measure 1 .91 .18 .16 
Measure 2 .85 .36 .23 
Measure 3 .83 .24 .18 
Measure 4 .76 -.53 .12 
Measure 5 -.65 .61 .03 
Measure 6 .89 -.33 .12 
Measure 7 -.65 .66 .12 
Measure 8 -.90 -.12 .18 
Measure 9 .67 .63 .01 
Measure 10 -.94 -.13 .07 
Measure 11 -.70 -.28 .61 
Percent of total 64.55 17.60 5.23 
variance explained 
These three factors account for more than 87% of the variance. The first two 
factors account for more than 82 %. The correlations between factors are close to 
zero ( +- .001) by definition. That suggests a different origin of these factors and 
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perhaps different spatial distribution in patterns of support by votes. Indeed, it is 
clear from maps of the two factors (FIGURE 12 and FIGURE 13) that there is a 
significant geographic component to patterns of support by the electorate. Factor 1 
is definitely the strongest (account for 64.6 % of the variance) and it can be called 
the socioeconomic factor (later in the thesis I will discuss it). It is first and foremost 
identified with the ''west/east" division in the county. Factor 2 is best characterized 
by a sharp center/periphery split, it can be called the life-cycle factor. The third 
factor accounts for only 5% of the variance and might be considered significant only 
for Measure 11 (school choice system). This factor has no clear spatial component 
and looks more patchy than localized, however it may relate to specifics about 
schools (FIGURE 14). The factor analysis confirmed the existence of two dimensions 
of the spatial distribution of votes which was found earlier. A rather interesting map 
may be obtained by overlaying Factor 1 and Factor 2 (FIGURE 15). Westsiders are 
more likely to vote in favor of all measures, the population of the eastern part of the 
county is also generally supportive of proposals, while people living in the central part 
of Portland are more likely to reject all measures or have a very mixed reaction. On 
the other hand, this map can suggest that these patterns reflect a rather complicated 
socioeconomic structure of the county, defining areas with the specific interests of the 
population. 
In order to prove the thesis of a strong geographical component in the 
electoral process, cluster analysis was made between votes for all eleven measures. 
Cluster analysis is a multivariable procedure for detecting natural groupings in data 
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and is used to classify a set of objects into groups. To get non-overlapping clusters, 
the K-means splitting method was used. The analysis was done for 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 
20 clusters using SYSTA ~- Spatial distributions of these clusters were mapped using 
Atlas Pro• software. The results of the analysis clearly shows a geographical 
component in referenda votes (FIGURES 16-21 ). 
When divided into three clusters (FIGURE 16), precincts in Multnomah 
County group into three geographical microregions: cluster No. 1- East & North-
from E 70th - E 80th avenues in Portland, towards the north-eastern part of NE 
Portland, and N Portland; cluster No.2- the Westside- not only geographically, as 
these precincts are not only wealthy neighborhoods but some of them are also a 
transition zone between the inner city and middle class suburbs; and cluster No. 3 -
the Central part of the city on both sides of the Willamette - the so-called inner 
city. 
The cluster analysis indicates that votes for anti-abortion and environmentally 
oriented measures (like 10 and 6) are better discriminators between precincts than 
tax reform measures such as 3, 7, 11. Other measures (8, 1, 2, 4, 9, and 5) also 
discriminate somewhat. The first cluster of precincts has a higher percentage of votes 
for tax reform and anti-abortion measures (5, 7, 8, 10, and 11) than the second and 
the third, but lower percentages for management efficiency and environmentally 
oriented measures (1, 2, 4, and 6). In fact, the maximum values for Measure 6 
(recycling standards) in the first cluster are lower than the minimum values for this 
variable in the third cluster, with some overlay in the second. The summary data for 
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four and five clusters is very similar (FIGURES 17-18). There are still very well 
defined "east" and ''west" parts of the county. The main difference appears in the 
central part, where the transition zone became more complicated, defining Portland's 
different neighborhoods, such as Downtown, and Alameda, with the specific structure 
of the population. The main discriminators are still the anti-abortion and 
environmental measures 10 and 6. 
Cluster analysis in which the number of clusters was increased to 6 and 7 
(FIGURES 19-20) added to the previous findings only one important part of the 
county- a section of North Portland with a predominantly black population (cluster 
No.6). Otherwise, there were no significant changes in patterns. An interesting fact 
is that even with the number of clusters increased up to twenty (FIGURE 21 ), the 
pattern of clustering between neighboring precincts remains. 
The conclusion that the maps resulting from cluster analysis show spatial 
groupings is based on visual inspection. However, while it is possible to visualize 
spatial patterns for a small number of clusters, it can be difficult to estimate spatial 
grouping for a large number of clusters (as in the case with twenty clusters). An 
attempt was made to quantify this. I did not use existing methods of measuring 
spatial correlation and autocorrelation. Such methods are well known (for example 
Griffith, 1987 and Orland, 1988). However they are very complicated, and most of 
them are based on parametric calculations which do not seem to be appropriate, 
especially in the case of precincts in Multnomah County which are very different in 
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size and location. Instead, a simpler sort of nearest neighbor analysis was 
performed4• A decision was made to use attributes of left/right polygons for the 
bounding arcs of ARC/INF08 coverages, i.e. each arc in the coverage is a boundary 
between different precincts and it has the attribute for the identification number (id) 
of left and right polygon (precinct). The id of the polygon was calculated by the 
number of the cluster. For example, if we had three different clusters, all polygons 
would be numbered as 1, 2, or 3, based on the cluster number. Then, if the id of the 
left and the right polygons are the same, the arc (boundary) between them would 
"dissolve" and it would be possible to count all "remained" or "dissolved" arcs. After 
that, one can compare the count with counts of the randomly "dispersed" id (these 
counts were calculated as an average of five random tests) and of the optimum 
clustering for the particular area. Optimum clustering was obtained by dividing the 
territory into several geographical regions, such as south, north, west, east, southwest, 
etc. (this was done by selecting boxes on the screen in ARC/INF08 and calculating 
ids for each polygon inside the box equal the No. of cluster). It also is possible to 
calculate percentages of arcs that "dissolved" for clusters of measures, as well as for 
randomly and optimally clustered areas. Scores might be calculated by stretching the 
scale: putting the percentage of the arcs "dissolved" for a randomly clustered area 
equal to zero, and for optimal clustering equal to one hundred. This method is very 
similar to the approach widely used in the remote sensing for enhancing the quality 
of images. The results of this analysis are shown in TABLE IV. The final high score 
4 Following the suggestion of Portland State University professor Richard 
Lycan. 
TABLE IV 
QUANTIFICATION OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL COMPONENT FOR 
CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF VOTES FOR THE ELEVEN MEASURES IN 
MULTNOMAH COUNTY 
# OF CLUSTERS OPTIMAL ACI'UAL RANDOM 
Percent of arcs dissolved 
3 79.48 67.37 23.00 
4 76.22 64.57 16.77 
5 75.37 57.47 15.50 
6 73.46 56.48 11.18 
7 72.89 56.33 10.54 
20 56.62 39.07 4.39 
Final scores 
3 100 78.57 0 
4 100 80.36 0 
5 100 70.09 0 
6 100 72.73 0 
7 100 73.44 0 
20 100 66.40 0 
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values confirm the existence of strong spatial groupings, even when the analysis for 
20 clusters was performed, substantiating the visual inspection. The advantage of this 
approach is that it is relatively easy to perform using ARC/INFo• and the results are 
compatible throughout the given area. However, for wider use in the future this 
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method needs some comparison with the existing methods, which might be the focus 
of further research. 
One explanation for such spatial groupings may be that households chose to 
reside in areas where their neighbors share their political and social values. 
An east/west split in Portland attitudes is well known, and it has deep 
historical roots. C. Abbott (1987) noted that this split unifies and divides the 
metropolitan area. It overlies and mitigates the socioeconomic contrast between 
central city and suburbs and thereby prevents a degree of social polarization. The 
cluster analysis appears to agree with this, and shows a wide transition zone between 
the two very different parts of the county. The other split is also well known in 
Anglo-American urban geographic literature: center (inner city)/periphery. As 
mentioned by L. Wirth in 1938, in the residential differentiation of the city, the urban 
fabric comes to resemble a 'mosaic of social worlds' (Timms, 1975). 
The next step is to compare voting patterns with social and economic 
characteristics of Multnomah County. 
Some important features of population in Multnomah county, which are 
derived from the 1990 census, are shown in TABLES V- VIII. The variables have 
been selected on the basis of their relevance in terms of the theory of voting behavior 
(Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Lipset, 1960; Cox, 1968; Guest, Hodge, 
Staeheli, 1988) and the availability of data. 
These and a number of other variables shown in Appendix B were adopted 
for correlation analysis between socioeconomic data and percentage of votes for the 
TABLE V 
NUMBER OF PERSONS BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN IN 
MULTNOMAH COUNTY 
RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN Number % 
White 508,463 86.99 
Black 35,129 6.01 
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut 6,738 1.15 
Asian, Pacific Islander 27,391 4.69 
Other Race 6,806 1.16 
Hispanic Origin 18,368 3.14 
TABLE VI 
NUMBER OF PERSONS, 18 AND OVER, BY 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN MULTNOMAH COUNTY 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT NUMBER % 
Less Than 9th Grade 22,824 5.09 
9th to 12th Grade, No Diploma 56,798 12.66 
High School Graduate 119,274 26.59 
Some College, No Degree 123,848 27.61 
Associate Degree 28,850 6.43 
Bachelor's Degree 64,863 14.46 
Graduate or Professional Degree 32,170 7.17 
-
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TABLE VII 
NUMBER OF EMPLOYED PERSONS, 16 AND OVER, BY 
INDUSTRY IN MULTNOMAH COUNTY 
INDUSTRY (OCCUPATION) NUMBER 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries 5,220 
Mining 323 
Construction 15,305 
Manufacturing, Nondurable Goods 15,190 
Manufacturing, Durable Goods 29,662 
Transportation 16,720 
Communications & Other Public Utilities 7,625 
Wholesale Trade 16,720 
Retail Trade 52,546 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 21,435 
Personal Services 9,385 
Entertainment & Recreation Services 4,583 
Health Services 26,603 
Educational Services 21,693 
Other Professional & Related Services 23,857 
Public Administration 9,089 
% 
1.78 
.11 
5.23 
5.19 
10.14 
5.48 
2.61 
5.71 
17.96 
5.93 
3.21 
1.57 
9.09 
7.41 
8.15 
3.11 
eleven measures in Multnomah County. Census data was recalculated for precincts 
instead of census block groups, using the method described above. The correlation 
matrix is shown in Appendix C. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
TABLE VIII 
NUMBER OF EMPLOYED PERSONS, 16 AND OVER, BY CLASS OF 
WORKER IN MULTNOMAH COUNTY 
CLASS OF WORKER NUMBER % 
Private, for Profit Wage and Salary 207,367 70.86 
Private, Not-For-Profit Wage and Salary 25,140 8.59 
Local Government 18,216 6.22 
State Government 9,803 3.35 
Federal Government 8,627 2.95 
Self-Employed 22,552 7.71 
Unpaid Family 941 .32 
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As indicated in a previous section, correlation coefficients between percentages 
of votes for different measures are high. The same is true for the set of 
socioeconomic variables that have a very high correlation with the votes (Appendix 
C). 
Management Efficiency Measures 
Measures connected with management efficiency were highly correlated with 
a high percentage of persons employed in public administration (Measure 1- .74, 
Measure 2 - . 78), health services (.53 and .49), and other professional and related 
services (.47 and .57) (TABLE IX). Other important characteristics were : 
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TABLE IX 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY 
MEASURES AND SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Measure 1 - Grants Measure 2 - Constitutional 
Metropolitan Service amendment allows merged 
District electon right school districts to combine 
to self-governance. tax bases • 
Percent of persons employed in public administration. .74 . 78 
Percent of persons employed in health services. .53 .49 
Percent of persons employed in other professional and .47 .57 
related services. 
Educational attainment. .78 .83 
Median family income. .50 .59 
Median value of the owner-occupied housing unit. .51 .52 
Median nonfamily income. .39 .49 
Median household income. .38 .49 
Percent of persons moved from the Northeast. .54 .46 
Family size. -.53 -.53 
Percent of persons employed in construction. -.62 -.62 
Percent of persons employed in manufacturing nondurable -.52 -.55 
goods. 
Percent of persons employed in agriculture, forestry, and -.51 -.52 
fJShery. 
Percent of persons employed in communications and other -.38 -.46 
public utilities. 
Factor 1. .81 .91 
educational attainment (.78 and .83); median family income (.50 and .59); median 
value of owner occupied housing units (.51 and .52); median nonfamily income (.39 
and .49); and median household income ( .38 and .49). Another variable with a high 
positive correlation coefficient was (perhaps coincidently) the percentage of persons 
who moved to Multnomah County from the Northeastern states (.54 and .46). 
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However, these measures were opposed in precincts with higher percentages of 
children and larger family size (-.53 and -.53); persons employed in construction ( -.62 
and -.62); manufacturing nondurable goods (-.52 and -.55); agriculture, forestry, and 
fishery (-.51 and -.52); and communications and other public utilities (-.38 and -.46). 
This group also has very correlation with the Factor 1 (socioeconomic) ( .81 and .91 ). 
This brief analysis of voting for management efficiency measures suggests a major 
split in attitudes between w!rite coll-u and blue collar workers in the county. 
Environmental Issues 
Another group of measures are the environmental issues (although one can 
also consider them as 'anti-business' proposals) - Measure 4 and Measure 6 (TABLE 
X). A high positive correlation was found between votes for these measures and the 
percentage of never married males in precincts ( .61 for Measure 4 and .58 for 
Measure 6); and never married females (.68 and .66). The percentage of never 
married females is especially important in age categories 25 - 34 years (.55 and .50) 
and 35 - 44 years (.50 and .49). The percentage of persons 18 years and over in 
precinct is also important ( .38 and .48). Migration is another important variable, as 
the correlation coefficients are higher in precincts with a larger percentage of people, 
who have come to Multnomah County during the last five years from the Northeast 
(.40 and .49) and from the central city of different Metropolitan statistical areas (.49 
and .54). Employment is also important, but not to the degree observed for 
Measures 1 and 2. Coefficients are high for persons employed in health services ( .39 
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TABLE X 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
AND SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Measure 4 - Prohibits Trojan Measure 6 - Product 
operations until nuclear packaging must meet 
waste, cost, earthquake l'e(.)'Ciing standards or 
standards are met. receive hardship waiver. 
Percent of never married males. .61 .58 
Percent of never married females. .68 .66 
Percent of never married females 25-34 years. .55 .50 
Percent of never married females 35-44 years. .50 .49 
Percent of persons 18 years and over. .38 .48 
Percent of persons moved from the Northeast. .40 .49 
Percent of persons moved from the central city of .49 .54 
different MSA 
Percent of persons employed in health services. .39 .51 
Percent of persons employed in public administration. .37 .58 
Percent of married males. -.59 -.55 
Percent of married females. -.59 -.54 
Percent of persons employed in manufacturing -.35 -.45 
nondurable goods. 
Factor 2 -.88 -.79 
and .51) and public administration (.37 and .58). The highest negative correlation can 
be found with the percentage of married males in a precinct (-.59 and -.55), the 
percentage of married females in a precinct (-.59 and -.54), and the percentage of 
persons employed in the manufacturing of nondurable goods ( -.35 and -.45). The 
analysis shows that the conflict here might be found not only in the sphere of 
production but also in a difference in the life cycle stage (which will be discussed 
later). Correlation coefficients with the Factor 2 are -.88 for Measure 4 and -.79 for 
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Measure 6. Married people without children are more likely to support 
environmental issues than other groups. However the color of the collar 
(economical factor) is also important. This finding contradicts empirical research 
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Lake, 1983) that people with more education feel 
a social obligation to vote, and they vote 'yes" because symbolic concern with 
protecting the environment is a luxury that occurs after food, shelter and other basic 
needs are met (VanLiere and Dunlap, 1980). Also it contradicts a Resources for the 
Future Survey of support for environmental protection programs (Council on 
Environmental Quality, Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency, 
1980) that found that 67 percent of Americans earning more than $15,000 a year 
support environmental protection programs, compared to 52 percent of those with 
income less than $8,000. 
Personal Rights and Freedoms Issues 
Measures associated with personal rights and freedoms, includes two anti-
abortion measures (Measure 8 and Measure 10) and the 'safety belt' measure 
(Measure 9) (TABLE XI). The first interesting thing about these groups is that 
people who voted ''for'' the two anti-abortion measures were likely to reject the 
'safety belt' measure, and vice versa, which might be connected with ideas of health 
and prosperity for individuals as well as for families. Although the variables with the 
high correlation coefficients for the measures in this group are similar, there are some 
differences. Income and education become the main discriminators for votes in this 
I 
TABLE XI 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN PERSONAL RIGHTS AND 
FREEDOMS ISSUES AND SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Measure 8 - Amends Measure 10- Measure 9-
Oregon Constitution Doctor must give Requires the use 
to prohibit abortion parent notice before of safety belts. 
with three exceptions. minor's abortion. 
Educational attainment. -.73 -.78 .83 
Median household income. -.40 -.41 .66 
Median family income. -.51 -.53 .73 
Median nonfamily income. -.43 -.45 .61 
Median value of the owner-occupied housing -.52 -.53 .62 
unit. 
Percent of persons moved from the Northeast. -.54 -.57 .32 
Percent of persons moved from the central -.52 -.55 .24 
cities of different MSA 
Percent of persons employed in public -.69 -.74 .79 
administration. 
Percent of persons employed in health -.52 -.55 .43 
services. 
Percent of persons employed in other -.48 -.50 .64 
professional and related services. 
Number of persons per family. .56 .59 -.40 
Percent of persons employed in agriculture, .46 .49 -.55 
forestry, and fiSheries. 
Percent of persons employed in construction. .53 .57 -.64 
Percent of persons employed in manufacturing .51 .56 -.48 
nondurable goods. 
Percent of persons employed in .36 .38 -.53 
communications and other pubUc utilities. 
Factor 1. -.64 -.n .87 
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group. The highest level of opposition to the anti-abortion measures (and support 
for the 'safety belt' measure for that matter) was in precincts with the highest 
educational attainment ( -. 73 for Measure 8, -. 78 for Measure 10, and .83 for Measure 
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9), highest median household income ( -.40, -.41, and .66); highest median family 
income (-.51, -.53, and .73); highest median nonfamily income (-.43, -.45, and .61); 
and highest median value of owner-occupied housing units (-.52, -.53, and .62). High 
correlation coefficients also were with a high percentage of persons coming from the 
Northeast (-.54, -.57, and .32) and from the central cities of different Metropolitan 
areas (-.52, -.55, and .24); also with high percentages of persons employed in public 
administration (-.69, -.74, and .79), health services (-.52, -.55, and .43); other 
professional and related services ( -.48, -.50, and .64). Support for the anti-abortion 
measures (and rejection of the 'safety belt' measure) was found in precincts with a 
high number of persons per family (.56, .59, and -.40); as well as with high 
percentages of persons employed in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (.46, .49, and-
.55), construction (.53, .57, and -.64), manufacturing nondurable goods (.51, .56, and-
.48); communications and other public utilities (.36, .38, and -.53). Again, the 
socioeconomic factor is important in this case - correlation coefficients with the 
Factor 1 are high ( -.64, -. 72, and .87). 
The 'safety belt' measure has another set of linkages that are unique for the 
group (and for the whole set of measures). This is the only measure that has a 
relatively high correlation with race/ethnicity variables. Indeed, correlation 
coefficients are high with the percentage of American Indians in a precinct ( -.49); 
'other race' persons (-.47); black males 18- 24 years (-.46); black males 45- 64 years 
( -.45); as well as percentages of young males and females of Hispanic origin in the 
county (-.47 and -.48 respectively). There also is a resistance among separated 
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females (-.50) and persons who have moved from another house but the same county 
(-.48). 
Tax Reform Measures 
The last group of measures is the one associated with tax reform (Measures 
3, 5, 7, and 11 ). Among this group, two subgroups can be seen. The first subgroup 
is dependent upon the set of socioeconomic variables - Measure 3 (repeals tax 
exemptions for PERS retirees) and Measure 11 (tax credit for education outside 
public schools) (TABLE XII). However, variables concomitant with votes for 
Measure 3 have an opposite effect on votes for Measure 11, although both were 
defeated in Multnomah County. These variables are educational attainment (. 79 for 
Measure 3 and -.62 for Measure 11 ); median family income (.56 and -.45); median 
household income ( .46 and -.38); median nonfamily income ( .45 and -.38); median 
value of the owner occupied housing unit (.52 and -.42); the percentage of persons 
from the Northeast (again!) in a precinct (.48 and -.30); the percentage of persons 
employed in public administration (.74 and -.58); health services (.55 and -.44); other 
professional and related services (.47 and -.42); and the percentage of persons 
employed in construction ( -.60 and .50); agriculture, forestry, and fisheries ( -.47 and 
.43); communications and other public utilities ( -.46 and .33); manufacturing 
nondurable goods ( -.45 and .38). Correlation coefficients with the socioeconomic 
factor (Factor 1) are- .84 (Measure 3) and -.41 (Measure 11). 
66 
TABLE XII 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN TAX REFORM MEASURES 
(FIRST SUBGROUP) AND SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Measure 3 - Repeals tax Measure 11 - School 
exemption, grants choice system, tax 
additional benefit payments credit for education 
for PERS retirees. outside public schools. 
Education attainment. .79 -.62 
Median family income. .56 -.45 
Median household income. .46 -.38 
Median nonfamily income. .45 -.38 
Median value of the owner-occupied housing unit. .52 -.42 
Percent of persons moved from the Northeast. .48 -.30 
Percent of persons employed in public administration. .74 -.58 
Percent of persons employed in health services. .55 -.44 
Percent of persons employed in other professional and .47 -.42 
related seiVices. 
Percent of persons employed in construction. -.60 .50 
Percent of persons employed in agriculture, forestry, and -.47 .43 
fiSheries. 
Percent of persons employed in communications and -.46 .33 
other public utilities. 
Percent of persons employed in manufacturing -.45 .38 
nondurable goods. 
Factor 1. .84 -.41 
The second subgroup consists of Measure 5 (limit on property taxes for 
schools and government operations) and Measure 7 (welfare benefits pilot program), 
both of which passed in Multnomah County (TABLE XIII). Another set of variables 
is associated with these measures. As in the group of environmental issues, they 
mainly reflect the stage of life cycle rather than socioeconomic status. High positive 
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TABLE XIII 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN TAX REFORM MEASURES 
(SECOND SUBGROUP) AND SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Measure 5 - State Measure 7- Six-
constitutional limit on county work in lieu 
property taxes for of welfare benefits 
schools, government pilot program. 
operations. 
Percent of owner-occupied housing units. .57 .48 
Percent of manied males. .76 .65 
Percent of manied females. .75 .64 
Percent of persons lived in the same house for at least five yean. .47 .36 
Percent of whites. .47 .29 
Percent of other race males 25-44 yean. -.45 -.26 
Percent of never manied males. -.66 -.58 
Percent of never manied females. -.76 -.61 
Percent of never manied females 25-34 years. -.59 -.SO 
Percent of never manied females 35-44 years. -.52 -.47 
Percent of divorced females. -.52 -.48 
Percent of persons living in the Portland and having moved to -.58 -.55 
another bouse or apartment during the last ftve yean. 
Percent of persons moved from the Northeast. -.SO -.42 
Factor 2. .87 .91 
I 
correlation coefficients were found in percentage of owner-occupied housing units in 
the precincts (.57 for Measure 5 and .48 for Measure 7); married males (.76 and .65); 
married females (.75 and .64); persons who lived in the same house for at least five 
years (.47 and .36); also, the white population was more likely to support these 
measures (.47 and .29) and the 'other race males 25 - 44 years' to reject them (-.45 
and -.26). High negative coefficients were found with percentage of never-married 
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males in a precinct ( -.66 and -.58); never married females ( -. 76 and -.61 ), especially 
in age groups 25 - 34 years (-.59 and -.50) and 35 - 44 years (-.52 and -.4 7); divorced 
females (-.52 and -.48); persons living in Portland and having moved to another house 
or apartment during the last five years (-.58 and -.55), and persons who moved to 
Multnomah County from the Northeast (-.50 and -.42). Unlike the first subgroup, the 
"life-cycle" factor (Factor 2) plays a major role for these measures. Correlation 
coefficients are .87 for Measure 5 and .91 for Measure 7. 
Measure 5 was the most controversial among the measures in the November, 
1990, elections. The outcomes of this Measure will influence life in Oregon for many 
years. An article in The Oregonian by R. Sahr and R. Mason (April23, 1993) stated 
that a telephone survey of a random sample of 604 Oregon voters completed by 
Oregon State University researchers one week prior to the November, 1990, vote 
showed that voters supported Measure 5 because they wanted property tax relief. 
Yet, my analysis shows that the correlation coefficient between votes for Measure 5 
and the median value of owner-occupied housing units is only .11. These coefficients 
are slightly higher with median family income (.21), median nonfamily income (.24), 
and median household income ( .34 ). The point here is that voters decisions are 
sometimes more complex than they would seem, and that a non-survey (ecological) 
analysis very often might give a researcher a more accurate picture of the forces 
behind voter's decision-making. 
In the spatial distribution of votes, two major factors seem to influence the 
geographic distribution of voters choices. First is a sharp east/west division of the 
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county. In general, the more liberal part of the county is associated with the western 
part of the City of Portland, and is closely linked to higher educational attainment 
areas and white-collar suburbs. Indeed, because most individuals in the metropolitan 
areas still live in some proximity to their workplaces (Guest et al, 1988), residential 
areas in the western and central parts of Portland especially have attracted large 
numbers of workers to service industries. This partly reflects the nearby location of 
educational institutions, including Portland State University, and also major medical-
health complexes. Other workers from these industries are concentrated in higher 
income areas in northeast Portland's Alameda district and the south-eastern part of 
the city. In contrast, workers in manufacturing are congregated more in the 
northern and eastern parts of the city. The second split, center/periphery, is 
associated with marital status and migration (part of the life cycle). Traditionally, 
central neighborhoods are acting as so called "stopover neighborhoods" (Abbott, 
1987), with a high percentage of newcomers who can influence the political life of the 
area. People do not usually stay there for a long time, migrating after several years 
to suburbs. 
One of the most interesting findings is that some of the chosen variables were 
not important for Multnomah County, including, in most cases, gender, race, ethnicity, 
and to some extent age structure. This result contradicts the results of other 
researchers. Non-partisan elections in American cities have been characterized by 
ethnic-based voting (O'Loughlin, 1981; Sharp, 1987), or at least cities have been 
viewed as contested areas that are shaped by political conflict not only between 
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business, political actors, and labor, but also between genders, races, and ethnicities 
(Oarke and Kirby, 1990; Cox, 1991; Fincher, 1989, Hodge and Staeheli, 1992). 
However, the fact that these factors are not playing the major role in the voting (for 
measures) process might be simply a distinguishing peculiarity of Multnomah County 
within the United States. 
Of course, testing all measures (or even several groups of measures) on a one-
by-one basis is not an easy task, since the attention is spread among eleven measures 
and several dozen census variables. Another way to check the importance of 
socioeconomic variables is to take factor scores from a principal components analysis 
for the eleven measures from each precinct and run a correlation analysis between 
these scores and the census data. These variables are most important for the 
geographical patterns of voting shown above. The complete table of correlation 
coefficients is shown in Appendix D. 
Factor 1 ( 64.55 percent of total variance explained) has a clear ''west/east" 
geographic split. All measures, except Measure 5 and Measure 7, have high 
correlation coefficients with factor scores. Variables with high correlation coefficients 
(more +- .45) are persons employed in public administration (.77); construction (-
.59); "other professional and related services" (.58); manufacturing nondurable goods 
( -.49), agriculture, forestry & fisheries ( -.49); communication & other public utilities 
( -.48); as well as median family income ( .68); median household income ( .61 ); median 
nonfamily income (.57); median value of the owner-occupied housing unit (.63). Only 
two variables with high coefficients might be considered as non-socioeconomic: the 
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percentage of separated females ( -.48), and the percentage of persons residing in the 
same county since 1985. This factor may be called the "socioeconomic factor" as the 
socioeconomic status is usually measured by the educational achievement and income, 
professional and managerial employment, and ownership of expensive homes 
(Greenberg et al, 1989). 
Factor 2 explained 17.6 percent of the variance. Unlike the ''west/east" split 
of Factor 1, Factor 2 has a very strong "inner city/periphery" split. The outcome of 
votes for four measures have essentially strong correlation coefficients with this factor 
- Measure 7 ( .91) - work on welfare benefits, Measure 5 ( .87) - limit on property 
taxes for schools and government operations, Measure 4 ( -.88), and Measure 6 ( -. 79) 
-both being environmentally oriented. These results might demonstrate 'rational self-
interest', 'socioeconomic status', 'taxpayer revolt' and 'community conflict' from 
Cataldo and Holm (1983) explanations of local voting. Census variables with a high 
correlation are completely different from what is seen in the first factor. Variables 
with the highest positive coefficients are: married females (. 78), married males (. 77), 
percent of owner-occupied housing units (.59), and percent of persons living in the 
same house for at least five years. The highest negative correlation can be found 
among the percentage of never married females (-.74) and males (-.71); persons 
having moved during the last five years from the central city of the same 
metropolitan area ( -.60); divorced females (-.53) and males (-.50); and males widowed 
( -.47) or separated ( -.46). These variables might be characterized in terms of "life 
cycle stage". 
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The term "life cycle" is used here not to emphasize the importance of age 
structure, as it appears to be not very significant in the analysis (at least not if using 
the census definition), but rather to the significance of different stages (positions) in 
the family life cycle and strong determinative effects upon the area of residence 
which the family selected (Gans, 1962). 
The clear "inner city/periphery" split and the high correlation coefficient above 
make it possible to use previous findings on a wide mixture of types of people in the 
inner city. Gans (1962) suggested that there are five groups, which he designated as 
cosmopolities, the unmarried and childless, the ethnic villages (neighborhoods), the 
deprived, and the trapped. The reasons underlying their central location are 
threefold: choice, economic disability, and age structure. The young unmarried 
element illustrates the functioning of the life cycle factor, since typically they are 
found in inner city areas only in the early stages of their life cycle and move to more 
peripheral areas when they marry and rise families. As a family grows older and 
children leave their parents, the parents' needs for the large amounts of space 
correspondingly diminish. Whether a family chooses to live in the inner or the 
peripheral parts of a city can therefore be determined by its assessments of the 
importance of land inputs as against commuting inputs and the balance of this 
equation of family budgeting will change depending on with stage of its life-cycle the 
family is in as much as upon its income level (Robson, 1971 ). 
A sizable number of potential measures of socioeconomic indicators that are 
expected to influence electoral behavior have been derived. While the logic behind 
73 
each individual relationship is understandable, it is critical not to lose sight of the fact 
that these characteristics (conditions) do not exist independently of each other. 
Indeed, income is related conceptually and empirically to a large number of other 
conditions, such as education, occupation, and tenure status (Hodge et al, 1992). So 
the performed factor analysis simplified these relationships. 
IS THERE A NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECf? 
As it was mentioned earlier, many empirical studies have indicated the 
existence of broad patterns of behavior (as exemplified by aggregate data) which are 
consistent with the concept of structural effects. Here, I would like to illustrate an 
empirical method that might be used to investigate whether structural effects exist in 
certain circumstances. It is frequently suggested that the voting behavior of ' 
individuals depends not only on their personal characteristics (especially their 
socioeconomic status) but also on the characteristics of the population among whom 
they live (Taylor and Johnston, 1979). This example of a structural effect if often 
termed the "neighborhood effect", indicating that individuals are affected by the 
milieu of their local environment (Johnston, Hay, and Rumley, 1984). 
The method I used in my analysis, suggested by O'Loughlin (O'Loughlin, 
1981 ), is based on testing residuals between voting on different issues and 
socioeconomic characteristics of the population. According to the structural effect 
hypothesis, the greater the proportion of individuals in a population who are in a 
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particular socioeconomic group, the greater the proportion of members of that group 
who support a particular issue (Rumley, 1979). 
First of all, to test the spatial distribution of the regression, residuals between 
votes for Measure 8 (anti-abortion) and educational attainment were calculated. 
Measure 8 and educational attainment were chosen because votes for Measure 8 are 
a rather good discriminator between precincts, and this variable has a high negative 
correlation coefficient with educational attainment (-.73). The residuals were 
calculated in SuperCalc•5 and mapped in Atlas Pro• (FIGURE 22). The map shows 
that in the central part of Portland, people favored the measure even less than 
predicted by the regression, and in the eastern part favored more. However, the 
picture is somewhat mosaic. 
From the overview above, it is known that socioeconomic variables are unable 
to completely explain variations of votes. O'Loughlin (1981) proposed a simple 
model of voting behavior: 
Vote % = f( sociaVeconomic status, social context, relative space, campaign 
effort, other electoral cleavages, random elements). 
Relative space and campaign efforts were excluded from the analysis because 
all measures were state-wide and the analysis were done only for one county, so that 
5 Computer Associates International, Inc., SuperCalc•, 
Jose, CA, 1989. 
Ver. 5.0, San 
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the whole area should be covered at least by the same television and radio stations. 
The influence of campaign efforts in changing a voter's preference or in swinging 
undecided voters has not been well documented. On the other hand, referenda 
returns, unlike other votes, are not complicated by personality, party or (often) 
campaign efforts. However, in order to check the neighborhood effect presence and 
significance, a further analysis was done. 
A conceptual problem noted by O'Loughlin (1981) is that in using aggregate 
data to study political context, the contextual effect itself is essentially the product of 
a group effort upon an individual. Affected individuals were put into groups, making 
what should be an individual focus an aggregate examination. This can result in 
possible aggregation bias, produced by differences between the specification bias of 
aggregate and individual level estimation. Additionally, it is assumed that individuals 
living in heterogeneous block groups behave in a similar fashion and are subject to 
similar influences as voters living in homogeneous neighborhoods. Yet all the 
evidence (Keller, 1968) points to the opposite - different interaction intensity and 
pattern. However, it is simply impossible to use a data-cell smaller than a precinct, 
so it was assumed that heterogeneity is minimized. 
Residuals were calculated for each precinct between the eleven measures and 
also some important socioeconomic variables, including percentage of never-married 
females, number of persons per family, educational attainment, and percentage of 
persons employed in the manufacture of nondurable goods. After that, correlation 
coefficients between these residuals were calculated (Appendix E). These coefficients 
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appeared to be high. The average absolute value of the correlation coefficients is .39. 
That means that the deviations from the regression occur for different sets of 
variables within the same precincts. 
In order to understand how these residuals are geographically distributed, 
cluster analyses were prepared for residuals between educational attainment, persons 
employed in the manufacture of nondurable goods, never married females, family size 
and Measures 1, 3, 5, 8, and 9 (these measures are from different groups and of 
different origin; and the correlation coefficients between these measures and selected 
socioeconomic variables are high). These clusters were then mapped. As shown in 
FIGURES 23- 28, even with the increase of the number of clusters of the residuals 
up to twenty, they seem to be located in neighboring precincts, which might be the 
true evidence of the neighborhood effect in elections in Multnomah County. 
In order to quantify the results, the same procedure was used for clusters of 
votes for the eleven measures, using ARC/INFo• capabilities. Scores appear to be 
high, confirming good spatial clustering among residuals (TABLE XIV). This might 
confirm the existence of the neighborhood effect. 
One of the problems in these analyses is the significant autocorrelation in the 
residuals. As Geary (1968) argued, if residuals from the regression are not 
significantly autocorrelated while originals were, then the independent variables 
completely 'explain' the phenomenon. The discussion on autocorrelation presented 
here was performed by O'Loughlin in 1981 for larger areas, namely for census tracts. 
My analysis suggests the strong possibility of a neighborhood effect. A more detailed 
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Figure 23. Three clusters of residuals of votes for the eleven 
measures on November 1990 Elections. 
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Figure 24. Four clusters of residuals of votes for the eleven 
measures on November 1990 Elections. 
-....) 
\0 
MULTN OMAH CO UNTY PRE CINCTS RES IDUAL'S CLUSTERS 
VOTES IN NOVEMBER 1990 
1!11 2 
0 3 
4 
JJJ s 
D Missing 
Figure 25. Five clusters of residuals of votes for the eleven 
measures on November 1990 Elections. 
00 
0 
MULTNOMAH CO UN TY PRE CINCTS 
VOTES IN NOVEMBER 1990 
\._ 
RESIDUAL'S CLUSTERS 
- 2 -0 3 
4 
5 . 6 
D Missing 
Figure 26. Six clusters of residuals of votes for the eleven 
measures on November 1990 Elections. 
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Figure 27. Seven clusters of residuals of votes for the eleven 
measures on November 1990 Elections. 
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Figure 28. Twenty clusters of residuals of votes for the eleven 
measures on November 1990 Elections. 
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TABLE XIV 
QUANTIFICATION OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL COMPONENT OF THE 
RESIDUALS BETWEEN VOTES FOR THE ELEVEN MEASURES IN 
MULTNOMAH COUNTY AND SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES 
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# OF CLUSTERS OPTIMAL ACTUAL RESIDUALS RANDOM 
Percent of arcs dissolved 
3 79.48 67.37 58.74 23.00 
4 76.22 64.57 58.74 16.77 
5 75.37 57.47 53.86 15.50 
6 73.46 56.48 53.79 11.18 
7 72.89 56.33 53.57 10.54 
20 56.62 39.07 37.58 4.39 
Final scores 
3 100 78.57 63.28 0 
4 100 80.36 70.60 0 
5 100 70.09 64.07 0 
6 100 72.73 68.41 0 
7 100 73.44 69.01 0 
20 100 66.40 63.55 0 
analysis must be performed in order to confirm or to reject its presence. 
Within the whole voting population, the neighborhood effect may not be very 
important in determining electoral outcome, since a contextual vote in one part of 
the county may be counterbalanced by a similar vote in other areas. Nevertheless, 
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if we wish to understand why people are voting as they do, it is important to isolate 
and measure a possible contextual effect. 
The last question asked was about the role of existing neighborhoods in 
Portland in connection with voting behavior. My analysis does not directly answer 
this question as it requires an extensive separate analysis of neighborhoods. As a 
basis for the future investigation, two maps were done in a manner, I would call 
"look-and-see", where the twenty clusters of votes for the eleven measures and twenty 
clusters of residuals between four socioeconomic variables and five measures were 
printed within neighborhood boundaries as they existed on October, 1992 (FIGURES 
29-30). Some differences between neighborhood boundaries and different clusters 
are due to the fact that very often precinct and neighborhood boundaries do not 
match. However, in FIGURE 29 the diversity inside neighborhoods is greater, than 
in FIGURE 30. This fact suggests that there are no direct influences of the 
neighborhood on voting. At the same time, it shows that existing neighborhoods 
reflect to some extent differences in social and economic status among residents of 
Portland. 
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Figure 29. Portland's officially recognized neighborhood 
boundaries and twenty clusters of votes for the eleven measures 
on November 1990 Elections (by precincts) . 
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Figure 30. Portland's officially recognized neighborhood 
boundaries and twenty clusters of residuals of votes for the 
eleven measures on November 1990 Elections (by precincts) . 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
Voting is immediately intelligible as an act of citizenship that provides 
individuals with the opportunity to voice their views formally on issues and to select 
representation (Ettlinger, 1990). Elections in most democratic countries are 
surrounded by intense and prolonged discussion of spatial patterns of support for 
candidates, parties, and issues. The primary purpose of this thesis has been an 
attempt to understand the relationships between ballot items and socioeconomic 
characteristics of the electorate using less aggregated electoral and census data in 
more geographically detailed research. 
The analysis of results of November, 1990, votes for the eleven issues on the 
ballot resulted in the following conclusions: 
First, within selected categories (management efficiency, tax reform, 
environmental issues, and personal rights) the correlation coefficients are 
exceptionally high. Discrepancy between passed and defeated measures on the one 
hand and measures with high correlation on the other, shows to some extent the 
different origin and possible outcome of these proposals. 
Second, the geographical distribution of the votes for the eleven issues appears 
in two major dimensions which might be aggregated to ''westside versus eastside" and 
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"inner city (central part of the city) versus periphery''. Factor analysis of voting 
outcomes confirmed these fmdings. 
Third, cluster analysis of votes defined geographical areas in Multnomah 
County with common patterns of votes. According to the analysis, neighboring 
precincts have a common pattern of votes, creating very distinctive geographical 
regions. This spatial pattern does not disappear with an increase in the number of 
clusters. More numerous clusters define more specific areas of the city (for example, 
African-American neighborhoods). The GIS method of analysis was invented in 
order to quantify the geographical component of cluster analysis. Such method allows 
relative comparisons within the context. However, it lacks a basis for comparison 
with the other existing methods. 
Fourth, new GIS capabilities including the use of ARC/INF08 , make it 
possible to perform better, more geographically detailed analysis of census data and 
comparison with the outcome of elections. Census data were recalculated by 
precincts, instead of using existing procedures in which data is employed by far larger 
census tracts. It also became possible to use smaller census divisions - less 
aggregated data by census block groups. Correlation between census and voting data 
was found, and socioeconomic variables with the high correlation coefficients with 
votes were established. These variables reflects two dimensions important in studying 
of the voters behavior: socioeconomic status (education, income, occupation) and 
position in the life cycle (age, marital status, family size). However, the origin of a 
particular measure has, to some extent, very little influence on a set of variables with 
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high (or low) correlation coefficients and issues, which at first appear unrelated, are 
based on similar patterns of support. 
Fifth, an attempt to investigate the existence of the neighborhood effect was 
done. My analysis did not answer this question directly. In my analysis, I used the 
method of O'Loughlin (1981) of calculating residuals between voting outcome and 
socioeconomic data (with high correlation coefficients with votes). After the 
exhaustive analysis of inter-personal variations the presence of a strong geographical 
pattern suggests the existence of a neighborhood effect. However, further analysis 
must be performed to confirm or reject its presence. A conclusion on the possible 
role of existing neighborhoods in voting behavior also has to be confirmed by using 
other methods of analysis. 
Further research is needed to develop and evaluate models of analyses of the 
voting behavior. The experimental method of quantification of the geographical 
clustering, suggested in the thesis, needs comparisons with other existing methods and 
after that can be used in a large variety of different researches along with more 
sophisticated methods. It is essentially important to use different models for cluster 
and regression analyses in order to evaluate contextual effects in voting. The 
available statistical apparatus, GIS capabilities, and the modeling opportunities are 
many, however, further work is needed to benefit from them. 
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Measure 1. Grants Metropolitan Service District electors the right to self-
governance. 
Shall the state constitution give the metropolitan service district the 
right of self-governance, over metropolitan matters, through district 
charter? Passed, (55/45). 
Measure 2. Constitutional amendment allows merged school districts to 
combine tax bases. 
Shall constitution allow school district created by merger a tax base 
equal to the sum of tax bases of merged districts? Passed, (70/30). 
Measure 3. Repeals tax exemption, grants additional benefit payments for 
PERS retirees. 
Shall tax exemption for PERS (Public Employer's Retirement System) 
members pensions be repealed, and the amount equaling taxes plus 11 
percent interest returned to IRS retires? Failed, ( 44/56). 
Measure 4. Prohibits Trojan operation until nuclear waste, cost, earthquake 
standards are met. 
Shall the nuclear power plant (Trojan) be allowed to operate only if 
state regulatory agency finds that certain conditions are met? Failed, 
( 49.9/50.1). 
Measure 5. State constitutional limit on property taxes for schools, 
government operations. 
Shall the constitution set limits on property taxes, and dedicate them 
to fund public schools and non-school government operations? Passed, 
(55/45). 
Measure 6. Product packaging must meet recycling standards or receive 
hardship waiver. 
By 1993, shall packaging used in Oregon meet certain recycling goals, 
100 
unless a hardship waiver is obtained? Passed, (53/47). 
Measure 7. Six-county work in lieu of welfare benefits pilot program. 
Shall Oregon law establish a program of work by public assistance 
recipients for government-funded wages in lieu of welfare benefits? 
Passed, (57/43). 
Measure 8. Amends Oregon Constitution to prohibit abortion with three 
exceptions. 
Shall the state constitution prohibit abortions except to prevent death 
of pregnant woman and in reported cases of rape or incest? Failed, 
(27/73). 
Measure 9. Requires the use of safety belts. 
Shall a law, effective December 7, 1990, require safety belt use by 
motor vehicle drivers and passengers over 16? Passed, (61/39). 
Measure 10. Doctor must give parent notice before minor's abortion. 
Shall state law require a doctor to give notice to a parent or custodian 
at least two days before minor's abortion? Failed, ( 41/59). 
Measure 11. School choice system, tax credit for education outside public 
schools. 
Should Constitution provide choice of public schools, tax credit for 
education outside public schools, voter approval of certain education 
laws? Failed, (32/68). 
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P0120043M 
P0120048M 
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P0120088M 
P0120089P 
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SPECIFIED OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS- MEDIAN VALUE 
OWNER OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS 
RENTER OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS 
MEASURE 1 
MEASURE2 
MEASURE3 
MEASURE4 
MEASURES 
MEASURE6 
MEASURE7 
MEASURES 
MEASURE9 
MEASURE 10 
MEASURE 11 
WHITE PERSONS 18 YEARS & OVER 
BLACK PERSONS 18 YEARS & OVER 
AMERICAN INDIANS, ESKIMO, OR ALEUT PERSONS 18 YEARS & 
OVER 
ASIAN OR PACIFIC ISLADER PERSONS 18 YEARS & OVER 
OTIIER RACE PERSONS 18 YEARS & OVER 
HISPANIC PERSONS 18 YEARS & OVER 
TOTAL PERSONS 18 YEARS & OVER 
MALE PERSONS 
FEMALE PERSONS 
WHITE PERSONS 
BLACK PERSONS 
AMERICAN INDIANS, ESKIMO, OR ALEUT PERSONS 
ASIAN OR PACIFIC ISLADER PERSONS 
OTHER RACE PERSONS 
TOTAL PERSONS UNDER 18 YEARS 
TOTAL PERSONS 18 - 24 YEARS 
TOTAL PERSONS 25 - 44 YEARS 
TOTAL PERSONS 45 - 64 YEARS 
TOTAL PERSONS 65 & OVER 
WHITE MALES UNDER 18 YEARS 
WHITE MALES 18 - 24 YEARS 
WHITE MALES 25 - 44 YEARS 
WHITE MALES 45 - 64 YEARS 
WHITE MALES 65 & OVER 
WHITE FEMALES UNDER 18 YEARS 
WHITE FEMALES 18 - 24 YEARS 
WHITE FEMALES 25 - 44 YEARS 
WHITE FEMALES 45 - 64 YEARS 
WHITE FEMALES 65 & OVER 
BLACK MALES UNDER 18 YEARS 
BLACK MALES 18 - 24 YEARS 
BLACK MALES 25 - 44 YEARS 
BLACK MALES 45 - 64 YEARS 
BLACK MALES 65 & OVER 
BLACK FEMALES UNDER 18 YEARS 
P0120110M 
P0120114M 
P0120119M 
P0120120P 
P0120136M 
P0120141M 
P0120145M 
P0120150M 
P0120151P 
P0120167M 
P0120172M 
P0120176M 
P0120181M 
P0120182P 
P0120198M 
P0120203M 
P0120207M 
P0120212M 
P0120213P 
P0120229M 
P0120234M 
P0120238M 
P0120243M 
P0120244P 
P0120260M 
P0120265M 
P0120269M 
P0120274M 
P0120275P 
P0120291M 
P0120296M 
P0120300M 
P0120305M 
P0120306P 
P0130012M 
P0130017M 
P0130021M 
P0130026M 
P0130027P 
P0130043M 
P0130048M 
P0130052M 
P0130057M 
P0130058P 
P0140001 
P0140002 
P0140003 
P0140004 
P0140005 
BLACK FEMALES 18 - 24 YEARS 
BLACK FEMALES 25 - 44 YEARS 
BLACK FEMALES 45 - 64 YEARS 
BLACK FEMALES 65 & OVER YEARS 
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AMERICAN INDIANS, ESKIMO, OR ALEUT MALES UNDER 18 
YEARS 
AMERICAN INDIANS, ESKIMO, OR ALEUT MALES 18 - 24 YEARS 
AMERICAN INDIANS, ESKIMO, OR ALEUT MALES 25 - 44 YEARS 
AMERICAN INDIANS, ESKIMO, OR ALEUT MALES 45 - 64 YEARS 
AMERICAN INDIANS, ESKIMO, OR ALEUT MALES 65 & OVER 
AMERICAN INDIANS, ESKIMO, OR ALEUT FEMALES UNDER 18 
YEARS 
AMERICAN INDIANS, ESKIMO, OR ALEUT FEMALES 18- 24 YEARS 
AMERICAN INDIANS, ESKIMO, OR ALEUT FEMALES 25-44 YEARS 
AMERICANINDIANS,ESKIMO,ORALEUTFEMALES45-64 YEARS 
AMERICAN INDIANS, ESKIMO, OR ALEUT FEMALES 65 & OVER 
ASIAN OR PACIFIC ISLADER MALES UNDER 18 YEARS 
ASIAN OR PACIFIC ISLADER MALES 18-24 YEARS 
ASIAN OR PACIFIC ISLADER MALES 25 - 44 YEARS 
ASIAN OR PACIFIC ISLADER MALES 45 - 64 YEARS 
ASIAN OR PACIFIC ISLADER MALES 65 YEARS & OVER 
ASIAN OR PACIFIC ISLADER FEMALES UNDER 18 YEARS 
ASIAN OR PACIFIC ISLADER FEMALES 18 - 24 YEARS 
ASIAN OR PACIFIC ISLADER FEMALES 25 - 44 YEARS 
ASIAN OR PACIFIC ISLADER FEMALES 45-64 YEARS 
ASIAN OR PACIFIC ISLADER FEMALES 65 YEARS & OVER 
OTHER RACE MALES UNDER 18 YEARS 
OTHER RACE MALES 18 - 24 YEARS 
OTHER RACE MALES 25 - 44 YEARS 
OTHER RACE MALES 45 - 64 YEARS 
OTHER RACE MALES 65 YEARS & OVER 
OTHER RACE FEMALES UNDER 18 YEAR 
OTHER RACE FEMALES 18 - 24 YEARS 
OTHER RACE FEMALES 25 - 44 YEARS 
OTHER RACE FEMALES 45 - 64 YEARS 
OTHER RACE FEMALES 65 YEARS & OVER 
MALES OF HISPANIC ORIGIN UNDER 18 YEARS 
MALES OF HISPANIC ORIGIN 18- 24 YEARS 
MALES OF HISPANIC ORIGIN 25- 44 YEARS 
MALES OF HISPANIC ORIGIN 45 - 64 YEARS 
MALES OF HISPANIC ORIGIN 65 YEARS & OVER 
FEMALES OF HISPANIC ORIGIN UNDER 18 YEARS 
FEMALES OF HISPANIC ORIGIN 18- 24 YEARS 
FEMALES OF HISPANIC ORIGIN 25 - 44 YEARS 
FEMALES OF HISPANIC ORIGIN 45- 64 YEARS 
FEMALES OF HISPANIC ORIGIN 65 YEARS & OVER 
MALE 15 YEARS & OVER NEVER MARRIED 
MALE 15 YEARS & OVER NOW MARRIED, EXCEPT SEPARATED 
MALE 15 YEARS & OVER SEPARATED 
MALE 15 YEARS & OVER WIDOWED 
MALE 15 YEARS & OVER DIVORCED 
P0140006 
P0140007 
P0140008 
P0140009 
P0140010 
P017A001 
R0370004 
R0370005 
R0370006 
R0380001 
R0380002 
R0380003 
R0380004 
R0380005 
R0380006 
R0380007 
R0380008 
R0430001 
R0430002 
R0430003 
R0430004 
R0430005 
R0430006 
R0430007 
R0430008 
R0430009 
R0430010 
R0440001 
R0440002 
R0440003 
R0440004 
R0440005 
R0440006 
R0440007 
R0600000 
R0770001 
R0770002 
R0770003 
R0770004 
R0770005 
R0770006 
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FEMALE 15 YEARS & OVER NEVER MARRIED 
FEMALE 15YEARS & OVER NOW MARRIED, EXCEPTSEP ARATED 
FEMALE 15 YEARS & OVER SEPARATED 
FEMALE 15 YEARS & OVER WIDOWED 
FEMALE 15 YEARS & OVER DIVORCED 
PERSONS PER FAMILY 
18 YEARS & OVER NATIVE 
18 YEARS & OVER NATURALIZED CITIZEN 
18 YEARS & OVER NOT A CIDZEN 
FEMALES 15 - 24 YEARS NEVER MARRIED 
FEMALES 25 - 34 YEARS NEVER MARRIED 
FEMALES 35 - 44 YEARS NEVER MARRIED 
FEMALES 45 YEARS & OVER NEVER MARRIED 
FEMALES 15 - 24 YEARS EVER MARRIED 
FEMALES 25 - 34 YEARS EVER MARRIED 
FEMALES 35 - 44 YEARS EVER MARRIED 
FEMALES 45 YEARS & OVER EVER MARRIED 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985 - SAME HOUSE 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985 -SAME COUNTY 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985 - SAME STATE 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985 - NORTHEAST 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985 - MIDWEST 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985 - SOUTH 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985 - WEST 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985 - PUERTO RICO 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985- U.S. OUTLYING 
AREA 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985 - FOREIGHN 
COUNTRY 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985 - SAME HOUSE 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985 - CENTRAL 
CITY{fHIS MSA/PMSA 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985- REMAINDER OF 
THIS MSA/PMSA 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985 - CENTRAL 
CITY/DIFFERERENT MSA/PMSA 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985- REMAINDER OF 
DIFFERENT MSA/PMSA 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985 - NOT IN 
MSA/PMSA 
PERSONS 5 YEARS & OVER RESIDENCE IN 1985 - ABROAD 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER - AGRICULTURE, 
FORESTRY, AND FISHERIES 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER - MINING 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER - CONSTRUCTION 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER - MANUFACfURING, 
NONDURABLE GOODS 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER - MANUFACfURING, 
DURABLE GOODS 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER - TRANSPORTATION 
R0770007 
R0770008 
R0770009 
R0770010 
R0770011 
R0770012 
R0770013 
R0770014 
R0770015 
R0770016 
R0770017 
R0790001 
R0790002 
R0790003 
R0790004 
R0790005 
R080A001 
R107A001 
RllOAOOl 
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EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER - COMMUNICATIONS 
AND OTHER PUBLIC UTILITIES 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER -WHOLESALE TRADE 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER- RETAIL TRADE 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER- FINANCE, INSURANCE, 
AND REAL ESTA1E 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER- BUSINESS AND REP AIR 
SERVICES 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER- PERSONAL SERVICES 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16YEARS &OVER- ENTERTAINMENT AND 
RECREATION SERVICES 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER- HEALTH SERVICES 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER - EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER- OTHER PROFESSIONAL 
AND RELAlED SERVICES 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER - PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER- PRIV AlE FOR PROFIT 
WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER - PRIVATE 
NOT-FOR-PROFIT WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER- LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
WORKERS 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER- STAlE GOVERNMENT 
WORKERS 
EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS & OVER - FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT WORKERS 
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN 1989 
MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME IN 1989 
MEDIAN NONFAMILY INCOME IN 1989 
APPENDIXC 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN MEASURES AND 
SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES 
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M1 M2 M3 M4 MS M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 Mll 
HH61A001 0.51 0.52 0.52 -0.03 0.11 0.17 0.09 -0.52 0.62 -0.53 -0.42 
H0030001 -0.18 -0.01 -0.06 -0.42 0.57 -0.35 0.48 0.14 0.23 0.15 -0.07 
H0030002 0.18 0.01 0.06 0.42 -0.57 0.35 -0.48 -0.14 -0.23 -0.15 0.07 
N0000001 0.14 0.32 0.01 -0.16 0.47 -0.14 0.28 -0.15 0.34 -0.20 -0.14 
N0000002 -0.11 -0.29 0.06 0.13 -0.43 0.13 -0.24 0.11 -0.26 0.18 0.07 
N0000003 -0.14 -0.30 -0.15 0.14 -0.21 0.01 -0.22 0.13 -0.46 0.16 0.31 
N0000004 -0.05 -0.01 -0.16 0.10 -0.13 0.08 -0.12 0.05 -0.13 0.03 0.10 
N0000005 -0.23 -0.34 -0.18 0.03 -0.13 -0.05 -0.14 0.20 -0.40 0.23 0.25 
N0000006 -0.19 -0.34 -0.17 0.12 -0.25 0.02 -0.25 0.15 -0.44 0.17 0.26 
N0000007 0.51 0.51 0.39 0.38 -0.37 0.48 -0.35 -0.53 0.36 -0.57 -0.33 
P0050001 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.12 -0.09 0.15 
P0050002 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.12 0.00 -0.10 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.09 -0.15 
P0060001 0.15 0.33 0.02 -0.17 0.47 -0.14 0.29 -0.15 0.34 -0.20 -0.15 
P0060002 -0.11 -0.30 0.05 0.14 -0.43 0.13 -0.25 0.12 -0.27 0.18 0.08 
P0060003 -0.18 -0.33 -0.19 0.17 -0.23 0.02 -0.29 0.13 -0.49 0.16 0.31 
I P0060004 -0.06 0.00 -0.18 0.09 -0.14 0.08 -0.13 0.05 -0.11 0.02 0.13 
P0060005 -0.25 -0.39 -0.24 0.04 -0.17 -0.05 -0.17 0.24 -0.47 0.27 0.28 
P0110012M -0.45 -0.46 -0.37 -0.25 0.19 -0.37 0.25 0.48 -0.35 0.51 0.33 
P0110017M -0.10 -0.13 -0.14 0.12 -0.19 0.06 -0.09 0.11 -0.21 0.10 0.22 
P0110021M -0.11 -0.10 0.13 0.10 -0.11 0.00 -0.04 0.15 -0.15 0.14 0.15 
P0110026M -0.26 -0.21 -0.2 -0.30 0.23 -0.33 0.30 0.27 -0.07 0.28 0.15 
P0110027P -0.19 -0.13 -0.19 -0.16 -0.01 -0.15 0.07 0.21 -0.04 0.20 0.08 
P0120012M -0.39 -0.32 -0.38 -0.31 0.39 -0.43 0.37 0.43 -0.21 0.43 0.28 
P0120017M -0.13 -0.29 0.04 0.10 -0.39 0.1 -0.20 0.12 -0.25 0.19 0.11 
P0120021M -0.13 -0.29 0.04 0.10 -0.39 0.1 -0.20 0.13 -0.25 0.19 0.10 
P0120026M -0.13 -0.29 0.06 0.09 -0.37 0.09 -0.18 0.14 -0.22 0.19 0.07 
P0120027P -0.08 -0.27 0.10 0.12 -0.38 0.13 -0.21 0.10 -0.20 0.14 -0.01 
P0120043M -0.32 -0.40 -0.30 0.00 -0.08 -0.13 -0.12 0.25 -0.46 0.28 0.33 
P0120048M -0.08 -0.08 -0.16 0.07 -0.07 0.01 -0.02 0.09 -0.16 0.07 0.21 
P0120052M -0.18 -0.25 -0.17 0.06 -0.15 -0.03 -0.14 0.14 -0.32 0.15 0.29 
P0120057M -0.11 -0.21 -0.11 0.18 -0.26 0.09 -0.26 0.10 -0.33 0.11 0.26 
- - -
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M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 
P0120058P -0.08 -0.15 -0.07 0.07 -0.11 0.02 -0.10 0.09 -0.23 0.10 0.23 
P0120074M -0.16 -0.18 -0.15 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 0.13 -0.16 0.14 0.14 
P0120079M -0.34 -0.44 -0.28 -0.04 -0.08 -0.17 -0.08 0.27 -0.46 0.31 0.32 
P0120083M -0.17 -0.26 -0.16 0.09 -0.15 -0.01 -0.17 0.16 -0.33 0.17 0.26 
P0120088M -0.28 -0.35 -0.25 0.09 -0.17 -0.05 -0.19 0.21 -0.45 0.23 0.33 
P0120089P -0.22 -0.30 -0.19 0.03 -0.14 -0.07 -0.13 0.15 -0.33 0.19 0.21 
P0120105M -0.05 -0.01 -0.12 0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.09 -0.08 0.06 0.13 
P0120110M -0.20 -0.26 -0.16 -0.07 -0.09 -0.11 0.00 0.21 -0.23 0.23 0.15 
P0120114M -0.27 -0.22 -0.30 -0.07 0.02 -0.13 0.01 0.24 -0.24 0.24 0.25 
P0120119M 0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.15 -0.18 0.14 -0.11 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 0.07 
P0120120P -0.04 0.01 -0.15 0.11 -0.15 0.09 -0.11 0.04 -0.12 0.02 0.13 
P0120136M -0.18 -0.09 -0.22 -0.06 0.02 -0.09 0.01 0.16 -0.12 0.15 0.14 
P0120141M -0.06 -0.02 -0.10 0.07 -0.10 0.04 -0.11 0.09 -0.07 0.05 0.11 
P0120145M -0.22 -0.17 -0.26 -0.06 0.02 -0.12 0.01 0.21 -0.19 0.21 0.23 
P0120150M -0.16 -0.07 -0.16 -0.28 0.32 -0.30 0.34 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.11 
P0120151P 0.00 0.03 -0.07 0.13 -0.17 0.14 -0.12 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.08 
P0120167M -0.09 -0.02 -0.18 0.05 -0.09 0.02 -0.04 0.09 -0.11 0.07 0.14 
P0120172M -0.18 -0.11 -0.23 -0.05 0.02 -0.09 0.01 0.19 -0.12 0.17 0.14 
P0120176M -0.02 0.02 -0.07 0.13 -0.15 0.11 -0.17 0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.09 
P0120181M -0.29 -0.38 -0.23 -0.06 -0.06 -0.15 -0.02 0.26 -0.38 0.30 0.26 
P0120182P -0.21 -0.28 -0.17 -0.07 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 0.20 -0.29 0.22 0.24 
P0120198M -0.21 -0.29 -0.19 0.00 -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 0.20 -0.32 0.22 0.26 
P0120203M -0.12 -0.22 -0.10 0.01 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08 0.15 -0.27 0.16 0.25 
P0120207M -0.23 -0.11 -0.25 -0.28 0.21 -0.27 0.21 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.11 
P0120212M 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.14 -0.21 0.11 -0.23 -0.02 -0.16 -0.03 0.06 
P0120213P -0.31 -0.39 -0.27 -0.06 -0.06 -0.15 -0.06 0.28 -0.40 0.31 0.26 
P0120229M -0.14 -0.23 -0.13 0.03 -0.12 -0.01 -0.09 0.16 -0.28 0.17 0.21 
P0120234M -0.22 -0.30 -0.20 0.03 -0.12 -0.06 -0.12 0.17 -0.34 0.20 0.23 
P0120238M -0.23 -0.29 -0.17 0.02 -0.15 -0.05 -0.13 0.18 -0.31 0.22 0.18 
P0120243M -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 0.06 -0.15 0.01 -0.10 0.07 -0.18 0.08 0.13 
P0120244P -0.39 -0.32 -0.38 -0.31 0.39 -0.43 0.37 0.42 -0.21 0.43 0.27 
P0120260M -0.05 -0.05 -0.13 0.10 -0.10 0.03 -0.04 0.08 -0.14 0.05 0.17 
P0120265M -0.08 -0.01 -0.13 0.03 0.07 -0.07 0.08 0.13 -0.03 0.10 0.08 
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P0120269M -0.25 -0.13 -0.24 -0.37 0.38 -0.39 0.39 0.24 0.01 0.24 0.10 
P0120274M -0.13 -0.04 -0.18 -0.14 0.03 -0.13 0.08 0.16 0.02 0.14 0.06 
P0120275P -0.17 -0.33 0.01 0.06 -0.35 0.05 -0.17 0.17 -0.27 0.23 0.14 
P0120291M -0.13 -0.28 0.05 0.11 -0.38 0.11 -0.20 0.13 -0.24 0.18 0.13 
P0120296M -0.08 -0.25 0.07 0.16 -0.45 0.16 -0.26 0.10 -0.24 0.15 0.11 
P0120300M -0.11 -0.27 0.07 0.11 -0.40 0.11 -0.21 0.12 -0.22 0.18 0.08 
P0120305M -0.09 -0.27 0.09 0.11 -0.39 0.12 -0.21 0.11 -0.21 0.16 0.01 
P0120306P -0.17 -0.33 0.01 0.06 -0.35 0.05 -0.16 0.16 -0.27 0.23 0.13 
P0130012M -0.39 -0.48 -0.31 -0.12 -0.01 -0.24 0.02 0.36 -0.47 0.40 0.35 
P0130017M -0.22 -0.30 -0.19 -0.05 -0.05 -0.12 -0.03 0.22 -0.32 0.23 0.26 
P0130021M -0.20 -0.27 -0.17 0.05 -0.15 -0.04 -0.13 0.19 -0.33 0.20 0.29 
P0130026M -0.12 -0.20 -0.08 0.03 -0.13 -0.03 -0.06 0.14 -0.24 0.15 0.23 
P0130027P -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 0.15 -0.26 0.11 -0.20 0.00 -0.16 0.00 0.13 
P0130043M -0.39 -0.49 -0.32 -0.11 -0.04 -0.22 -0.02 0.36 -0.48 0.40 0.33 
P0130048M -0.17 -0.27 -0.17 0.07 -0.17 -0.01 -0.15 0.18 -0.32 0.18 0.24 
P0130052M -0.20 -0.28 -0.15 0.11 -0.22 0.01 -0.19 0.17 -0.36 0.17 0.24 
I P0130057M -0.19 -0.25 -0.14 0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.09 0.17 -0.26 0.19 0.20 
I 
P0130058P -0.04 -0.10 -0.07 0.09 -0.28 0.07 -0.18 0.09 -0.14 0.08 0.09 
P0140001 0.36 0.17 0.25 0.61 -0.66 0.58 -0.58 -0.33 -0.10 -0.35 -0.04 
P0140002 -0.28 -0.07 -0.17 -0.59 0.76 -0.55 0.65 0.25 0.19 0.26 0.01 
P0140003 -0.04 -0.20 -0.04 0.25 -0.40 0.19 -0.37 -0.01 -0.37 0.02 0.19 
P0140004 -0.11 -0.19 -0.13 -0.05 -0.17 -0.04 -0.10 0.16 -0.19 0.18 0.17 
P0140005 0.07 -0.10 0.01 0.34 -0.38 0.26 -0.41 -0.11 -0.33 -0.11 0.17 
P0140006 0.44 0.28 0.33 0.68 -0.76 0.66 -0.61 -0.39 0.06 -0.43 -0.18 
P0140007 -0.28 -0.06 -0.17 -0.59 0.75 -0.54 0.64 0.25 0.19 0.26 0.00 
P0140008 -0.22 -0.43 -0.16 0.13 -0.39 0.03 -0.33 0.19 -0.50 0.25 0.24 
P0140009 -0.11 -0.14 -0.14 -0.11 -0.14 -0.07 -0.05 0.18 -0.08 0.19 0.04 
P0140010 0.06 -0.07 0.01 0.35 -0.52 0.26 -0.48 -0.09 -0.26 -0.07 0.03 
P017A001 -0.53 -0.53 -0.41 -0.31 0.31 -0.43 0.29 0.56 -0.40 0.59 0.36 
R0370004 0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.05 0.09 -0.05 0.11 -0.04 0.08 -0.01 -0.11 
R0370005 0.00 0.08 -0.02 -0.06 0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.02 -0.02 
R0370006 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 0.10 -0.14 0.08 -0.16 0.04 -0.17 0.01 0.15 
R0380001 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.30 -0.33 0.29 -0.20 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 0.07 
- - - -
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Ml M2 M3 M4 MS M6 M7 M8 M9 MlO Mll 
R0380002 0.28 0.15 0.2S o.ss -O.S9 o.so -O.SO -0.26 -O.OS -0.29 -O.OS 
R0380003 0.30 0.22 0.2S o.so -0.52 0.49 -0.47 -0.28 0.03 -0.31 -0.08 
R0380004 0.34 0.30 0.26 0.37 -0.44 0.43 -0.34 -0.25 0.18 -0.30 -0.08 
R0380005 -0.24 -0.28 -0.27 -0.04 -0.01 -0.14 -0.02 0.26 -0.42 0.24 0.36 
R0380006 -0.28 -0.28 -0.32 0.00 0.07 -0.13 0.03 0.27 -0.35 0.26 0.36 
R0380007 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.08 -0.03 0.00 
R0380008 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 -0.38 0.33 -0.29 0.27 0.02 0.16 0.06 -0.16 
R0430001 -0.21 -0.09 -0.09 -0.39 0.47 -0.33 0.36 0.20 0.15 0.22 -0.07 
R0430002 -0.25 -0.36 -0.27 0.09 -0.30 -0.04 -0.22 0.23 -0.48 0.27 0.27 
R0430003 033 0.34 0.24 0.26 -0.13 0.27 -0.10 -035 0.20 -0.37 -0.19 
R0430004 0.54 0.46 0.48 0.40 -0.38 0.49 -031 -0.54 0.32 -0.57 -0.30 
R0430005 0.36 0.27 0.27 0.29 -0.32 031 -0.26 -0.32 0.17 -0.33 -0.18 
R0430006 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.14 -0.17 0.19 -0.14 -0.19 0.05 -0.19 -0.04 : 
I 
R0430007 0.29 0.21 0.16 0.33 -0.31 033 -0.23 -0.26 0.06 -0.29 0.01 1 
R0430008 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.19 -0.16 0.13 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 -0.11 -0.07 
R0430009 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.04 
R0430010 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.10 -0.12 0.12 -0.12 0.00 -0.07 -0.04 0.17 
R0440001 -0.21 -0.09 -0.09 -0.39 0.47 -0.33 0.36 0.21 0.14 0.22 -0.06 
R0440002 0.06 -0.06 0.04 0.38 -0.58 0.34 -O.S5 -0.15 -0.25 -0.12 0.05 
R0440003 -0.24 -0.18 -0.25 -0.34 0.43 -0.41 0.47 0.30 -0.10 0.29 0.15 
R0440004 0.54 0.43 0.43 0.49 -O.SO 0.54 -0.42 -0.52 0.24 -0.55 -0.23 
R0440005 0.31 0.29 0.21 0.22 -0.12 0.27 -0.13 -0.31 0.17 -0.33 -0.07 
R0440006 0.12 0.08 0.02 0.24 -0.24 0.20 -0.11 -0.05 -0.03 -0.09 0.03 
R0440007 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.11 -0.12 0.12 -0.12 0.00 -0.07 -0.05 0.16 
R0600000 0.78 0.83 0.79 0.31 -0.19 0.53 -0.17 -0.73 0.83 -0.78 -0.62 
R0770001 -0.51 -0.52 -0.47 -0.26 0.25 -0.41 0.19 0.46 -0.55 0.49 0.43 
R0770002 -031 -0.37 -0.34 -0.13 0.03 -0.22 -0.02 0.34 -0.43 0.36 0.30 
R0770003 -0.62 -0.62 -0.60 -0.32 0.34 -0.49 0.22 0.53 -0.64 0.57 0.50 
R0770004 -0.52 -0.55 -0.45 -035 0.25 -0.45 0.23 0.51 -0.48 0.56 0.38 
R0770005 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.14 
R0770006 -0.36 -0.25 -031 -0.31 0.36 -0.38 0.33 0.33 -0.21 0.34 0.28 
R0770007 -0.38 -0.46 -0.46 -0.07 0.00 -0.23 0.01 0.36 -0.53 0.38 0.33 
R0770008 0.15 0.20 0.14 -0.13 0.04 -0.05 0.14 -0.12 0.29 -0.12 -0.18 
--
111 
~---- - -
Ml M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 MlO M11 
R0770009 -0.21 -0.27 -0.21 -0.03 ~.07 ~.10 ~.11 0.14 ~.33 0.18 0.20 
R0770010 ~.15 ~.28 ~.20 0.03 ~.16 ~.04 ~.11 0.16 ~.31 0.19 0.24 
R0770011 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.16 ~.17 0.13 ~.19 ~.09 ~.04 ~.10 ~.02 
R0770012 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.03 ~.05 0.08 0.03 ~.06 0.18 ~.08 ~.11 
R0770013 0.23 0.28 0.23 0.17 ~.15 0.26 ~.06 ~.20 0.31 ~.24 ~.17 
R0770014 0.53 0.49 0.55 0.39 ~.33 0.51 ~.37 ~.52 0.43 ~.55 ~.44 
R0770015 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.04 ~.08 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.02 ~.10 
R0770016 0.47 0.57 0.47 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.06 ~.48 0.64 ~.50 ~.42 
R0770017 0.74 0.78 0.74 0.37 ~.22 0.58 ~.22 ~.69 0.79 ~.74 ~.58 
R0790001 ~.14 ~.14 ~.11 ~.02 ~.02 ~.07 0.07 0.23 ~.08 0.21 0.07 
R0790002 0.33 0.32 0.25 0.25 ~.27 0.32 ~.19 ~.34 0.22 ~.37 ~.17 
R0790003 ~.17 ~.15 ~.17 ~.03 ~.05 ~.06 ~.02 0.17 ~.12 0.19 0.10 
R0790004 0.03 0.02 0.05 ~.13 0.23 ~.10 0.07 ~.10 0.01 ~.08 ~.04 
R0790005 ~.16 ~.16 ~.10 ~.07 0.05 ~.10 0.06 0.14 ~.14 0.15 0.16 
i R080A001 0.38 0.49 0.46 ~.19 0.34 0.01 0.29 ~.40 0.66 ~.41 ~.38 
R107A001 0.50 0.59 0.56 ~.09 0.21 0.13 0.18 ~.51 0.73 ~.53 ~.45 
R110A001 0.39 0.49 0.45 ~.09 0.24 0.09 0.19 ~.43 0.61 ~.45 ~.38 
APPENDIXD 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN FACfORS OF VOTES FOR 
ELEVEN MEASURES BY PRECINCfS AND 
SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES 
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FACfOR 1 FACfOR2 FACfOR 3 
VARIABL COEFF. VARIABL COEFF. VARIABL COEFF. 
M10 -0.723 M4 -0.879 M11 -0.848 
M8 -0.643 M6 -0.793 M8 -0.498 
R0770003 -0.587 P0140006 -0.735 M10 -0.410 
R0770004 -0.495 P0140001 -0.711 R0380006 -0.274 
R0770001 -0.491 R0380002 -0.615 R0380005 -0.257 
R0770007 -0.479 R0440002 -0.602 N0000003 -0.223 
P0140008 -0.477 H0030002 -0.586 R0770001 -0.217 
R0430002 -0.452 R0380003 -0.546 R0440007 -0.217 
M11 -0.414 P0140010 -0.534 R0430010 -0.215 
R0770002 -0.394 P0140005 -0.498 R0770003 -0.215 
N0000006 -0.368 R0440004 -0.470 M7 -0.190 
N0000005 -0.346 P0140003 -0.463 R0770004 -0.167 
N0000003 -0.326 P0140008 -0.415 R0770002 -0.161 
P0170001 -0.316 M1 -0.403 N0000006 -0.156 
R0380005 -0.309 R0380004 -0.392 R0430002 -0.154 
R0770009 -0.303 R0430004 -0.353 R0380001 -0.152 
R0380006 -0.291 N0000002 -0.347 N0000005 -0.152 
R0770010 -0.287 R0380001 -0.344 P0140005 -0.149 
N0000002 -0.279 R0430007 -0.321 R0370006 -0.148 
I P0140003 -0.266 N0000006 -0.320 R0770010 -0.148 
I P0140010 -0.215 R0430002 -0.320 R0770007 -0.145 
I 
R0770006 -0.213 N0000003 -0.313 P0140003 -0.144 
I 
I P0140004 -0.206 M3 -0.299 P0170001 -0.137 
R0440002 -0.204 R0770014 -0.286 R0770006 -0.136 
P0140009 -0.184 R0430005 -0.278 P0140008 -0.125 
R0790003 -0.183 R0440006 -0.230 M5 -0.123 
P0140005 -0.170 M2 -0.220 P0140004 -0.115 
I 
R0790005 -0.126 R0790002 -0.211 R0430007 -0.113 
114 
FACfOR 1 FACfOR2 FACfOR3 
VARIABL COEFF. VARIABL COEFF. VARIABL COEFF. 
M5 -0.122 N0000005 -0.200 H0030002 -0.113 
R0790001 -0.122 R0370006 -0.193 R0790005 -0.110 
H0030002 -0.113 R0770011 -0.190 R0440006 -0.109 
N()()()()()()4 -0.108 R0770010 -0.183 R0380004 -0.099 
R0440003 -0.095 R0430008 -0.179 P0140001 -0.095 
R0370006 -0.093 R0440007 -0.163 N0000004 -0.089 
M7 -0.063 R0430006 -0.161 R0380002 -0.086 
R0770005 -0.025 R0430010 -0.160 R0790001 -0.080 
R0380001 -0.009 N0000004 -0.159 R0380007 -0.080 I 
FACfOR2 -0.001 R0440005 -0.153 R0440003 -0.076 
I 
I 
R0440001 -0.000 R0430003 -0.136 R0380003 -0.071 
FACfOR3 0.001 R0140004 -0.124 R0770009 -0.065 
R0430001 0.001 R0770017 -0.123 R0430009 -0.063 
R0770011 0.009 R0770009 -0.123 R0790003 -0.059 
R0430008 0.024 R0380005 -0.097 N0000002 -0.058 
R0440006 0.032 R0770013 -0.081 R0440005 -0.036 
R0430010 0.033 R0770007 -0.079 R0440002 -0.030 
R0440007 0.036 R0380006 -0.059 P0140010 -0.012 
R0370004 0.045 R0770002 -0.043 R0430006 -0.009 
R0430009 0.048 R0790003 -0.036 P0140006 -0.008 
R0380008 0.050 P0140009 -0.035 R0770011 -0.007 
P0140001 0.055 R0600000 -0.028 FACfOR2 -0.000 
R0380002 0.056 R0770015 -0.002 FACTOR1 0.001 
R0790004 0.059 FACfOR1 -0.001 P0140009 0.004 
R0770015 0.059 FACfOR3 -0.000 R0370005 0.005 
I 
I 
R0370005 0.061 R0770005 0.009 R0770015 0.017 
P0140002 0.078 R0430009 0.011 R0770012 0.021 
P0140007 0.078 R0790001 0.012 R0770013 0.025 
-
115 
FACfOR 1 FACfOR2 FACTOR3 
VARIABL COEFF. VARIABL COEFF. VARIABL COEFF. 
R0380007 0.106 R0380007 0.013 R0430008 0.029 
H0030001 0.113 R0770012 0.021 M4 0.041 
I 
R0380003 0.118 R0790005 0.028 R0440004 0.052 I 
I 
R0430006 0.125 R0370005 0.084 R0790002 0.060 I 
P0140006 0.144 M9 0.100 R0430005 0.061 
R0770012 0.150 R0370004 0.114 R0430003 0.075 I 
R0430007 0.181 R0770001 0.125 N0000001 0.077 
I 
R0770008 0.220 R0790004 0.148 P0140002 0.087 
R0430005 0.228 R0770016 0.159 R0790004 0.088 
R0380004 0.240 M11 0.161 P0140007 0.092 
N0000001 0.249 R0770003 0.167 H0030001 0.113 
R0790002 0.268 R0770008 0.180 R0370004 0.116 
R0770013 0.275 R0770004 0.194 R0430004 0.124 
R0440005 0.283 H0610001 0.216 R0440001 0.125 
R0430003 0.301 P0170001 0.282 R0430001 0.126 
M4 0.303 R0770006 0.299 R0770008 0.128 
R0440004 0.362 N0000001 0.299 M6 0.128 
R0600000 0.406 R110AOOO 0.302 R0770005 0.132 
R0430004 0.418 R107 AOOO 0.321 R0600000 0.142 
R0770014 0.434 R0380008 0.411 M2 0.157 
M6 0.509 R080A001 0.419 M3 0.169 
R110AOOO 0.565 M8 0.424 M1 0.208 
R0770016 0.578 R0440003 0.433 R0770014 0.219 
I 
I R080A001 0.610 M10 0.452 R0770016 0.233 I 
H0610001 0.628 R0430001 0.482 R110AOOO 0.241 
R107AOOO 0.685 R0440001 0.482 R080A001 0.246 
P0770017 0.767 H0030001 0.586 R0380008 0.247 
M3 0.804 P0140007 0.768 R0770017 0.254 
-
116 
FACTOR 1 FACTOR2 FACTOR3 
VARIABL COEFF. VARIABL COEFF. VARIABL COEFF. 
Ml 0.823 P0140002 0.778 R107AOOO 0.272 
M9 0.871 M5 0.872 H0610001 0.281 
M2 0.908 M7 0.906 M9 0.289 
APPENDIXE 
CORRElATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN RESIDUALS (ELEVEN 
MEASURES AND EDUCATIONAL ATIAINMENT (EA), PERCENTAGE OF 
FEMALES NEVER BEEN MARRIED (FNM), FAMILY SIZE (FS), AND 
PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS EMPLOYED IN MANUFACfURING 
NONDURABLE GOODS (MN)) 
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lEA 2EA 3EA 4EA SEA 6EA 7EA SEA 9EA tOEA llEA 
lEA 1.00 0.63 0.51 0.60 -0.57 0.65 -0.52 -0.54 0.15 -0.64 -0.24 
2EA 0.63 1.00 0.30 0.41 -0.31 0.47 -0.31 -0.38 0.46 -0.53 -0.11 
3EA 0.51 0.30 1.00 0.41 -0.43 0.43 -0.38 -0.35 0.07 -0.39 -0.13 
4EA 0.60 0.41 0.41 1.00 -0.73 0.91 -0.77 -0.54 -0.14 -0.65 -0.19 
SEA -0.57 -0.31 -0.43 -0.73 1.00 -0.79 0.78 0.48 0.08 0.54 0.27 
6EA 0.65 0.47 0.43 0.91 -0.79 1.00 -0.78 -0.58 -0.06 -0.68 -0.22 
7EA -0.52 -0.31 -0.38 -0.77 0.78 -0.78 1.00 0.59 0.19 0.67 0.26 
SEA -0.54 -0.38 -0.35 -0.54 0.48 -0.58 0.59 1.00 0.00 0.93 0.44 
9EA 0.15 0.46 0.07 -0.14 0.08 -0.06 0.19 0.00 1.00 -0.03 -0.22 
tOEA -0.64 -0.53 -0.39 -0.65 0.54 -0.68 0.67 0.93 -0.03 1.00 0.38 
llEA -0.24 -0.11 -0.13 -0.19 o:n -0.22 0.26 0.44 -0.22 0.38 1.00 
lFNM 0.45 0.31 0.19 0.09 -0.03 0.12 -0.07 -0.18 0.18 -0.21 -0.12 
2FNM 0.23 0.51 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.08 -0.01 -0.11 0.31 -0.17 -0.03 
3FNM 0.16 0.11 0.54 0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.09 0.09 -0.09 -0.05 
4FNM 0.31 0.29 0.22 0.69 -0.26 0.56 -0.46 -0.33 -0.04 -0.41 -0.16 
5FNM -0.27 -0.17 -0.27 -0.33 0.65 -0.41 0.49 0.26 -0.06 0.26 0.28 
6FNM 0.29 0.30 0.20 0.45 -0.24 0.54 -0.36 -0.30 0.06 -0.35 -0.16 
7FNM -0.26 -0.18 -0.22 -0.46 0.40 -0.46 0.79 0.43 0.12 0.47 0.25 
8FNM -0.19 -0.17 -0.12 -0.12 0.04 -0.14 0.19 0.58 -0.07 0.49 0.29 
9FNM 0.05 0.24 0.02 -0.11 0.08 -0.07 0.14 0.02 0.56 0.01 -0.12 
10FNM -0.20 -0.25 -0.12 -0.14 0.03 -0.16 0.19 0.45 -0.09 0.47 0.22 
llFNM -0.10 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.08 -0.05 0.10 0.28 -0.21 0.22 0.78 
lFS 0.55 0.28 0.31 0.33 -0.27 0.34 -0.24 -0.18 0.08 -0.22 -0.11 
2FS 0.24 0.48 0.14 0.16 -0.06 0.17 -0.06 -0.03 0.27 -0.11 -0.01 
3FS 0.21 0.07 0.63 0.19 -0.19 0.19 -0.16 -0.08 0.02 -0.08 -0.04 
4FS 0.50 0.31 0.37 0.94 -0.65 0.84 -0.70 -0.42 -0.16 -0.52 -0.16 
5FS -0.49 -0.22 -0.41 -0.69 0.96 -0.74 0.73 0.38 0.10 0.43 0.24 
6FS 0.47 0.30 0.35 0.77 -0.63 0.83 -0.63 -0.37 -0.08 -0.46 -0.16 
I 
7FS -0.44 -0.22 -0.36 -0.74 0.73 -0.74 0.96 0.50 0.21 0.57 0.24 
8FS -0.25 -0.11 -0.22 -0.33 0.24 -0.33 0.34 0.59 0.04 0.50 0.30 
9FS -0.04 0.15 -0.01 -0.16 0.15 -0.13 0.21 0.15 0.58 0.15 -0.09 
lOFS -0.28 -0.19 -0.23 -0.38 0.25 -0.37 0.35 0.46 0.02 0.49 0.22 
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11FS -0.09 0.02 -0.07 -0.09 0.13 -0.10 0.14 0.24 -0.17 0.17 0.80 
1MN 0.61 0.32 0.32 0.31 -0.32 0.35 -0.29 -0.27 0.05 -0.30 -0.13 
2MN 0.30 0.52 0.15 0.14 -0.11 0.18 -0.11 -0.12 0.25 -0.18 -0.02 
3MN 0.25 0.09 0.65 0.18 -0.22 0.19 -0.19 -0.14 0.00 -0.13 -0.05 
4MN 0.53 0.33 0.38 0.94 -0.68 0.85 -0.73 -0.47 -0.18 -0.56 -0.17 
SMN -0.53 -0.26 -0.42 -0.69 0.97 -0.75 0.75 0.43 0.10 0.48 0.25 
6MN 0.51 0.33 0.37 0.76 -0.67 0.84 -0.67 -0.44 -0.10 -0.52 -0.17 
7MN -0.48 ..().26 -0.37 -0.74 0.75 -0.74 0.98 0.55 0.21 0.61 0.25 
8MN -0.32 -0.17 -0.23 -0.31 0.29 -0.34 0.38 0.68 0.05 0.58 0.31 
9MN -0.01 0.16 0.00 -0.20 0.13 -0.15 0.20 0.11 0.58 0.12 -0.10 
10MN -0.35 -0.24 -0.24 -0.36 0.31 -0.38 0.41 0.56 0.04 0.58 0.24 
1FNM 2FN 3FN 4FN SFN 6FN 7FN 8FN 9FN lOFN llFN 
M M M M M M M M M M 
UMN -0.13 0.00 -0.07 -0.08 0.16 -0.10 0.16 0.29 -0.15 0.22 0.81 
lEA 0.45 0.23 0.16 0.31 -0.27 0.29 -0.26 -0.19 0.05 -0.20 -0.10 
2EA 0.31 0.51 0.11 0.29 -0.17 0.30 -0.18 -0.17 0.24 -0.25 -0.04 
3EA 0.19 0.08 0.54 0.22 -0.27 0.20 -0.22 -0.12 0.02 -0.12 -0.04 
4EA 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.69 -0.33 0.45 -0.46 -0.12 -0.11 -0.14 -0.03 
SEA -0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.26 0.65 -0.24 0.40 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.08 
6EA 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.56 -0.41 0.54 -0.46 -0.14 -0.07 -0.16 -0.05 
7EA -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.46 0.49 -0.36 0.79 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.10 
SEA -0.18 -0.11 -0.09 -0.33 0.26 -0.30 0.43 0.58 0.02 0.45 0.28 
9EA 0.18 0.31 0.09 -0.04 -0.06 0.06 0.12 -0.07 0.56 -0.09 -0.21 
10EA -0.21 -0.17 -0.09 -0.41 0.26 -0.35 0.47 0.49 0.01 0.47 0.22 
llEA -0.12 -0.03 -0.05 -0.16 0.28 -0.16 0.25 0.29 -0.12 0.22 0.78 
1FNM 1.00 0.86 0.79 0.45 -0.28 0.69 -0.25 -0.76 0.76 -0.82 -0.59 
2FNM 0.86 1.00 0.73 0.41 -0.18 0.66 -0.18 -0.72 0.85 -0.82 -0.54 
3FNM 0.79 0.73 1.00 0.38 -0.26 0.60 -0.22 -0.68 0.70 -0.73 -0.53 
4FNM 0.45 0.41 0.38 1.00 -0.47 0.82 -0.62 -0.46 0.21 -0.52 -0.30 
5FNM -0.28 -0.18 -0.26 -0.47 1.00 -0.53 0.63 0.27 -0.11 0.27 0.29 
6FNM 0.69 0.66 0.60 0.82 -0.53 1.00 -0.57 -0.67 0.51 -0.73 -0.48 
I 
7FNM -0.25 -0.18 -0.22 -0.62 0.63 -0.57 1.00 0.39 0.00 0.39 0.25 
8FNM -0.76 -0.72 -0.68 -0.46 0.27 -0.67 0.39 1.00 -0.64 0.96 0.68 
9FNM 0.76 0.85 0.70 0.21 -0.11 0.51 0.00 -0.64 1.00 -0.71 -0.62 
120 
10FNM -0.82 -0.82 -0.73 -0.52 0.27 -0.73 0.39 0.96 -0.71 1.00 0.67 
llFNM -0.59 -0.54 -0.53 -0.30 0.29 -0.48 0.25 0.68 -0.62 0.67 1.00 
1FNM 2FN 3FN 4FN 5FN 6FN 7FN 8FN 9FN 10FN UFN 
M M M M M M M M M M 
1FS 0.79 0.63 0.63 0.41 -0.23 0.56 -0.19 -0.51 0.56 -0.56 -0.44 
2FS 0.71 0.85 0.63 0.39 -0.15 0.58 -0.13 -0.52 0.73 -0.62 -0.42 
3FS 0.62 0.55 0.89 0.34 -0.23 0.50 -0.17 -0.49 0.56 -0.53 -0.41 
4FS 0.21 0.17 0.19 0.74 -0.33 0.55 -0.45 -0.21 0.04 -0.24 -0.13 
5FS -0.05 0.02 -0.07 -0.28 0.66 -0.27 0.39 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.10 
6FS 0.38 0.34 0.35 0.63 -0.39 0.70 -0.42 -0.34 0.24 -0.38 -0.26 
7FS -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 -0.48 0.49 -0.39 0.79 0.18 0.11 0.17 0.12 
8FS -0.55 -0.49 -0.54 -0.44 0.24 -0.56 0.35 0.79 -0.45 0.73 0.56 
9FS 0.64 0.73 0.63 0.18 -0.08 0.43 0.05 -0.49 0.92 -0.55 -0.54 
10FS -0.61 -0.58 -0.58 -0.50 0.23 -0.62 0.36 0.73 -0.51 0.76 0.53 
UFS -0.46 -0.39 -0.43 -0.27 0.27 -0.40 0.22 0.54 -0.50 0.51 0.94 
lMN 0.77 0.60 0.58 0.32 -0.23 0.49 -0.20 -0.52 0.51 -0.55 -0.41 
2MN 0.69 0.82 0.58 0.29 -0.14 0.51 -0.13 -0.53 0.67 -0.60 -0.39 
3MN 0.60 0.52 0.86 0.26 -0.22 0.44 -0.17 -0.49 0.51 -0.51 -0.39 
4MN 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.69 -0.33 0.50 -0.45 -0.19 -0.01 -0.21 -0.10 
5MN -0.07 0.01 -0.07 -0.25 0.65 -0.25 0.39 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.11 
6MN 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.56 -0.39 0.65 -0.43 -0.34 0.19 -0.36 -0.23 
7MN -0.10 -0.02 -0.08 -0.45 0.49 -0.37 0.79 0.21 0.11 0.20 0.12 
8MN -0.53 -0.47 -0.49 ..().34 0.23 -0.49 0.35 0.80 -0.40 0.72 0.53 
9MN 0.61 0.69 0.58 0.09 -0.07 0.36 0.06 -0.48 0.88 -0.52 -0.51 
lOMN -0.59 -0.55 -0.53 -0.39 0.22 -0.53 0.36 0.74 -0.45 0.7S 0.50 
llMN -0.44 -0.37 -0.40 -0.21 0.26 -0.35 0.22 0.54 -0.46 0.50 0.92 
1FS 2FS 3FS 4FS SFS 6FS 7FS 8FS 9FS 10FS llFS 
lEA 0.55 0.24 0.21 O.SO -0.49 0.47 -0.44 -0.25 -0.04 -0.28 -0.09 
2EA 0.28 0.48 0.07 0.31 -0.22 0.30 -0.22 -0.11 O.lS -0.19 0.02 I 
I 
3EA 0.31 0.14 0.63 0.37 -0.41 0.35 -0.36 -0.22 -0.01 -0.23 -0.07 
4EA 0.33 0.16 0.19 0.94 -0.69 0.77 -0.74 -0.33 -0.16 -0.38 -0.09 
SEA -0.27 -0.06 -0.19 -0.65 0.96 -0.63 0.73 0.24 0.1S 0.25 0.13 
I 6EA 0.34 0.17 0.19 0.84 -0.74 0.83 -0.74 -0.33 -0.13 -0.37 -0.10 
7EA -0.24 -0.06 -0.16 -0.70 0.73 -0.63 0.96 0.34 0.21 0.35 0.14 
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SEA -0.18 -0.03 -0.08 -0.42 0.38 -0.37 0.50 0.59 0.15 0.46 0.24 
9EA 0.08 0.27 0.02 -0.16 0.10 -0.08 0.21 0.04 0.58 0.02 -0.17 
tOEA -0.22 -0.11 -0.08 -0.52 0.43 -0.46 0.57 0.50 0.15 0.49 0.17 
llEA -0.11 -0.01 -0.04 -0.16 0.24 -0.16 0.24 0.30 -0.09 0.22 0.80 
lFNM 0.79 0.71 0.62 0.21 -0.05 0.38 -0.08 -0.55 0.64 -0.61 -0.46 
2FNM 0.63 0.85 0.55 0.17 0.02 0.34 -0.01 -0.49 0.73 -0.58 -0.39 
3FNM 0.63 0.63 0.89 0.19 -0.07 0.35 -0.08 -0.54 0.63 -0.58 -0.43 
4FNM 0.41 0.39 0.34 0.74 -0.28 0.63 -0.48 -0.44 0.18 -0.50 -0.27 
5FNM -0.23 -0.15 -0.23 -0.33 0.66 -0.39 0.49 0.24 -0.08 0.23 0.27 
6FNM 0.56 0.58 0.50 0.55 -0.27 0.70 -0.39 -0.56 0.43 -0.62 -0.40 
7FNM -0.19 -0.13 -0.17 -0.45 0.39 -0.42 0.79 0.35 0.05 0.36 0.22 
8FNM -0.51 -0.52 -0.49 -0.21 0.03 -0.34 0.18 0.79 -0.49 0.73 0.54 
9FNM 0.56 0.73 0.56 0.04 0.05 0.24 0.11 -0.45 0.92 -0.51 -0.50 
lOFNM -0.56 -0.62 -0.53 -0.24 0.02 -0.38 0.17 0.73 -0.55 0.76 0.51 
UFNM -0.44 -0.42 -0.41 -0.13 0.10 -0.26 0.12 0.56 -0.54 0.53 0.94 
1FS 1.00 0.82 0.77 0.54 -0.41 0.69 -0.36 -0.71 0.63 -0.80 -0.52 
1FS 2FS 3FS 4FS 5FS 6FS 7FS 8FS 9FS 10FS UFS 
2FS 0.82 1.00 0.70 0.39 -0.20 0.57 -0.19 -0.64 0.80 -0.76 -0.47 
3FS 0.77 0.70 1.00 0.41 -0.32 0.57 -0.28 -0.65 0.62 -0.71 -0.47 
4FS 0.54 0.39 0.41 1.00 -0.71 0.89 -0.75 -0.52 0.08 -0.59 -0.26 
5FS -0.41 -0.20 -0.32 -0.71 1.00 -0.73 0.76 0.36 0.01 0.39 0.24 
6FS 0.69 0.57 0.57 0.89 -0.73 1.00 -0.71 -0.65 0.30 -0.72 -0.39 
7FS -0.36 -0.19 -0.28 -0.75 0.76 -0.71 1.00 0.45 0.09 0.48 0.23 
8FS -0.71 -0.64 -0.65 -0.52 0.36 -0.65 0.45 1.00 -0.50 0.95 0.63 
9FS 0.63 0.80 0.62 0.08 0.01 0.30 0.09 -0.50 1.00 -0.57 -0.55 
lOFS -0.80 -0.76 -0.71 -0.59 0.39 
r 
-0.72 0.48 0.95 -0.57 1.00 0.61 
llFS -0.52 -0.47 -0.47 -0.26 0.24 -0.39 0.23 0.63 -0.55 0.61 1.00 
1MN 0.72 0.51 0.53 0.36 -0.30 0.46 -0.26 -0.44 0.38 -0.48 -0.33 
I 
I 
2MN 0.53 0.69 0.46 0.20 -0.09 0.33 -0.08 -0.36 0.54 -0.43 -0.27 
3MN 0.56 0.46 0.83 0.28 -0.24 0.39 -0.20 -0.44 0.42 -0.47 -0.33 
4MN 0.38 0.21 0.28 0.91 -0.66 0.77 -0.71 -0.36 -0.08 -0.41 -0.15 
5MN -0.29 -0.07 -0.22 -0.62 0.94 -0.62 0.71 0.24 0.11 0.25 0.15 
6MN 0.48 0.33 0.39 0.76 -0.65 0.82 -0.64 -0.43 0.10 -0.48 -0.24 
7MN -0.25 -0.07 -0.18 -0.67 0.71 -0.61 0.94 0.34 0.19 0.35 0.15 
122 
i 8MN -0.42 -0.33 -0.40 -0.33 0.25 -0.40 0.34 0.70 -0.24 
0.61 0.43 
9MN 0.41 0.57 0.44 -0.08 0.10 0.11 0.18 -0.29 0.82 -0.32 
-0.41 
lOMN -0.47 -0.41 -0.43 -0.38 0.26 -0.45 0.36 0.63 -0.28 0.63 0.39 
11MN -0.34 -0.27 -0.32 -0.14 0.17 -0.24 0.16 0.46 -0.39 0.41 0.88 
1MN 2MN 3MN 4MN SMN 6MN 7MN 8MN 9MN 10MN llMN 
lEA 0.61 0.30 0.25 0.53 -0.53 0.51 -0.48 -0.32 -0.01 -0.35 -0.13 
2EA 0.32 0.52 0.09 0.33 -0.26 0.33 -0.26 -0.17 0.16 -0.24 0.00 
3EA 0.32 0.15 0.65 0.38 -0.42 0.37 -0.37 -0.23 0.00 -0.24 -0.07 
4EA 0.31 0.14 0.18 0.94 -0.69 0.76 -0.74 -0.31 -0.20 -0.36 -0.08 
SEA -0.32 -0.11 -0.22 -0.68 0.97 -0.67 0.75 0.29 0.13 0.31 0.16 
6EA 0.35 0.18 0.19 0.85 -0.75 0.84 -0.74 -0.34 -0.15 -0.38 -0.10 
I 
7EA -0.29 -0.11 -0.19 -0.73 0.75 -0.67 0.98 0.38 0.20 0.41 0.16 
SEA -0.27 -0.12 -0.14 -0.47 0.43 -0.44 0.55 0.68 0.11 0.56 0.29 
9EA 0.05 0.25 0.00 -0.18 0.10 -0.10 0.21 0.05 0.58 0.04 -0.15 
tOEA -0.30 -0.18 -0.13 -0.56 0.48 -0.52 0.61 0.58 0.12 0.58 0.22 
11EA -0.13 -0.02 -0.05 -0.17 0.25 -0.17 0.25 0.31 -0.10 0.24 0.81 
1FNM 0.77 0.69 0.60 0.18 -0.07 0.35 -0.10 -0.53 0.61 -0.59 -0.44 
2FNM 0.60 0.82 0.52 0.13 0.01 0.31 -0.02 -0.47 0.69 -0.55 -0.37 
3FNM 0.58 0.58 0.86 0.15 -0.07 0.31 -0.08 -0.49 0.58 -0.53 -0.40 
4FNM 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.69 -0.25 0.56 -0.45 -0.34 0.09 -0.39 -0.21 
5FNM -0.23 -0.14 -0.22 -0.33 0.65 -0.39 0.49 0.23 -0.07 0.22 0.26 
6FNM 0.49 0.51 0.44 0.50 -0.25 0.65 -0.37 -0.49 0.36 -0.53 -0.35 
7FNM -0.20 -0.13 -0.17 -0.45 0.39 -0.43 0.79 0.35 0.06 0.36 0.22 
8FNM -0.52 -0.53 -0.49 -0.19 0.07 -0.34 0.21 0.80 -0.48 0.74 0.54 
9FNM 0.51 0.67 0.51 -0.01 0.04 0.19 0.11 -0.40 0.88 -0.45 -0.46 
10FNM -0.55 -0.60 -0.51 -0.21 0.05 -0.36 0.20 0.72 -0.52 0.75 0.50 
11FNM -0.41 -0.39 -0.39 -0.10 0.11 -0.23 0.12 0.53 -0.51 0.50 0.92 
1FS 0.72 0.53 0.56 0.38 -0.29 0.48 -0.25 -0.42 0.41 -0.47 -0.34 
2FS 0.51 0.69 0.46 0.21 -0.07 0.33 -0.07 -0.33 0.57 -0.41 -0.27 
3FS 0.53 0.46 0.83 0.28 -0.22 0.39 -0.18 -0.40 0.44 -0.43 -0.32 
I 
I 
4FS 0.36 0.20 0.28 0.91 -0.62 0.76 -0.67 -0.33 -0.08 -0.38 -0.14 
5FS -0.30 -0.09 -0.24 -0.66 0.94 -0.65 0.71 0.25 0.10 0.26 0.17 
6FS 0.46 0.33 0.39 0.77 -0.62 0.82 -0.61 -0.40 0.11 -0.45 -0.24 
7FS -0.26 -0.08 -0.20 -0.71 0.71 -0.64 0.94 0.34 0.18 0.36 0.16 
123 
8FS -0.44 -0.36 -0.44 -0.36 0.24 -0.43 0.34 0.70 -0.29 0.63 0.46 
9FS 0.38 0.54 0.42 -0.08 0.11 0.10 0.19 -0.24 0.82 -0.28 -0.39 
10FS -0.48 -0.43 -0.47 -0.41 0.25 -0.48 0.35 0.61 -032 0.63 0.41 
llFS -0.33 -0.27 -0.33 -0.15 0.15 -0.24 0.15 0.43 -0.41 039 0.88 
1MN 1.00 0.82 0.76 0.52 -0.44 0.69 -0.39 -0.72 0.61 -0.80 -0.51 
2MN 0.82 1.00 0.68 0.36 -0.24 0.56 -0.22 -0.65 0.78 -0.15 -0.46 
3MN 0.76 0.68 1.00 0.39 -0.34 0.55 -0.30 -0.64 0.59 -0.69 -0.46 
4MN 0.52 0.36 0.39 1.00 -0.72 0.89 -0.76 -0.50 0.02 -0.56 -0.24 
5MN -0.44 -0.24 -0.34 -0.72 1.00 -0.15 0.77 0.40 0.00 0.43 0.25 
6MN 0.69 0.56 0.55 0.89 -0.15 1.00 -0.73 -0.64 0.26 -0.71 -0.37 
7MN -0.39 -0.22 -0.30 -0.76 0.77 -0.73 1.00 0.48 0.09 0.51 0.24 
8MN -0.72 -0.65 -0.64 -0.50 0.40 -0.64 0.48 1.00 -0.48 0.95 0.62 
9MN 0.61 0.78 0.59 0.02 0.00 0.26 0.09 -0.48 1.00 -0.54 -0.53 
10MN -0.80 -0.15 -0.69 -0.56 0.43 -0.71 0.51 0.95 -0.54 1.00 0.60 
llMN -0.51 -0.46 -0.46 -0.24 0.25 -0.37 0.24 0.62 -0.53 0.60 1.00 
